논문

The radical changes in the structure and management of local government that were set in motion in New Zealand by the Local Government Amendment Act of 1989 cannot be understood outside the context of the comprehensive process of economic reform that was being advanced, in a selectively radical fashion, first by a centre-left Labour government over the 1984-1990 period and then by a centre-right National administration over its first term between 1990 and 1993. The coherence of this process was sustained by the strong policy leadership collectively supplied by a reformist network comprising the New Zealand Treasury, reformist factions in both major political parties and a group of "change agents" who oversaw the restructuring of public institutions (Kelsey, 1995; Easton, 1997; Wallis, 1999). These key players were bound together by a shared commitment to advance reform according to principles the Treasury derived from a policy paradigm it constructed from a number of economic theories (public choice, agency theory, the new institutional economics and "new classical macroeconomics) that tended to highlight problems of government failure. As the dominant source of policy advice to Cabinet, the Treasury could play a "gatekeeper" role, screening policy proposals according to whether or not they advanced parallel processes of liberalization, stabilization and privatization that were expected to limit the scope for government failure in the form of rent-seeking, agency capture, bureaucratic empire-building and "populist" interference in the setting of monetary and fiscal policy. Although the Treasury could, in this respect, be regarded as the domestic guardian of the "Washington consensus" so that New Zealand pursued a reform direction similar to that being prescribed for other countries by the World Bank and IMF, it also devised bold and innovative proposals of its own, particularly in the area of public sector management.
The Treasury set out the blueprint for reform in this area in its briefing papers to the Labour government after it was re-elected in 1987. These recommended that public management reform be developed from a broad system-wide perspective derived primarily from agency theory and public choice that focused on "the lack of management incentives" that lay at root of pervasive government failure rather than on "the symptoms of dysfunctionality . . . such as financial waste, excessive rules and poor performance" (Bale and Dale, 1998). Cabinet consideration of these briefing papers gave Michael Bassett, the Minister of Local Government, the opportunity to highlight those aspects of local government structure and management that were inconsistent with the model that the Treasury was seeking to apply to core government departments. In particular, the following weaknesses were identified:


(a) the confusion between councillors and senior management about their roles;
(b) a built-in bias towards inefficiency resulting from the absence of contestability in the provision of council services, most of which were provided 'in-house';
(c) confusion between the commercial and non-commercial objectives in the management of council trading activities;
(d) the lack of appropriate incentives and accountability arrangements to enable elected representatives to hold managers accountable for resource use; and
(e) the diseconomies of scale in resource use and recruitment of quality management of too many small authorities (McKinlay, 1994, p.6).


Accordingly, when the Cabinet responded to the share market crash by introducing an urgent economic reform package in December 1987, Bassett succeeded in having a proposal to reform local government to address these problems included in this package.
He was well prepared to take advantage of this "window of opportunity" since during the 1985-7 period, he had developed a close working relationship with Brian Elwood, the chair of the Local Government Commission (LGC). Elwood had contacted councillors from every local authority to engage them in the process of reviewing their boundaries, functions, powers and relationships. By making clear to respondents that "no change was not going to be an acceptable response" (Bassett, 1996, p.33), Elwood was able to "flush out" those councillors whose resistance to reform could be anticipated and overcome as well as identify potential supporters who were willing to constructively contribute to proposals for change.
Realizing that "delay had defeated all previous attempts at reform" (Bassett, 1996, p.34), Bassett and Elwood adopted a number of tactics to "fast track" local government reform after 1987. Firstly, they worked to a timetable that required the changes to be in place within the Labour Government's second term since "to let the reforms spill beyond another general election in 1990 risked turning restructuring into a national election issue" (p.34). Secondly, as a result of the preparatory work done between 1985 and 1987, they now knew what they wanted to achieve and could afford to minimize the time available for further consultation. A Local Government Bill was drawn up and introduced in Parliament on 22 March 1988 which announced that new structures would be in place before local body election day on 14 October 1989 and gave the LGC sweeping powers to achieve this goal. This body could then proceed with its task of establishing new boundaries for local authorities while the officials working under Bassett could craft legislation specifying the principles under which these authorities were to be managed and made publicly accountable for their decisions. The third tactic the reformers deployed thus involved the simultaneous formulation of proposals for legislative and structural changes. Basset was thus able to push through the Local Government Amendment Bill specifying new management and accountability mechanisms on 23 May 1989, 15 days before he received from the LGC their proposed boundary changes that were to apply from the October elections.
For Basset, then, the reform process was like a military campaign in which speed, control of the commanding heights of the policy process and a refusal to be deflected from the achievement of clear objectives were of the essence. Such "blitzkrieg" tactics were being deployed by his Cabinet colleagues in a number of other policy areas to drive through radical reforms and have been severely criticized for their tendency to circumvent and undermine public trust in the democratic policy process in New Zealand (Kelsey, 1995; Easton, 1997). Both Bassett and Elwood appear, however, to take the view that the ends justified the means and considered that through these tactics they were able to succeed where others failed in putting in place reforms that largely realized their overarching goal which was " to balance democratization of process and the efficient and effective use of limited resources" (Elwood, 1996, p.312).
This paper will examine the content of these reforms, consider some of their outcomes and then deploy an "advocacy coalition framework" (Sabatier, 1991) to consider the main contours of the debate about the "unfinished business" of local government reform in New Zealand in the1990s. It will conclude by considering the relevance of this reform experience to other countries, particularly those that seek to embody "Asian values" in the practice of public administration.