

지방 분권화 대안으로서의 광역 거버넌스: 시카고 메트로폴리탄 사례를 중심으로

Regional Governance Against Political Fragmentation: The Case of Chicago Metropolitan

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Ⅰ 목 차 Ⅰ

- I. Introduction
- II. Debating on Suburbanization with Political Fragmentation
- III. Regionalism: Regional Coalitions of U.S. Metropolitan Areas
- IV. The Case of Chicago Metropolitan
- V. Conclusion and Policy Implications

이 연구는 미국 메트로폴리탄 안에서 지역의 한정된 자원을 효율적으로 활용하는 능력 성 추구의 광역행정주의를 종합적으로 고찰한다. 현 미국의 메트로폴리탄 지역은 광역행정과 지방행정 분권화 사이에서 갈등적 측면을 갖고 있다. 공공선택 이론가들은 시장경제 안에서 지방정부간의 경쟁을 통하여 지역주민에게 양질의 공공서비스를 제공해야하며, 그 경쟁은 지역 주민을 위한 공공서비스의 효율성을 증가 시킨다고 주장한다. 하지만 광역행정주의자들은 지방정부간의 심각한 경쟁이 지역갈등을 야기하고 지역자원의 효율적 활용을 저해한다고 주장한다. 그러므로 이 연구는 먼저 미국 메트로폴리탄의 확장에 의한 심각한 지방분권화 피해를 진단하며, 광역행정주의를 통한 미국 메트로폴리탄 지역의 행정 및 재정적 효율화를 검토한다. 또한 이 논문은 협력적·수평적 관계, 지방분권의 조화와 균형, 단체 간의 협동을 통한 행정의 민주적 측면을 고려하는 광역 거버넌스로 변화하고 있는 시

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카고 메트로폴리탄 광역행정의 사례를 제공한다. 따라서 지방자치의 보장이라는 정치적 측면과 지역의 한정된 자원을 효율적으로 활용하는 능률성 측면을 종합적으로 고려한 추가적 광역행정 연구들이 필요할 것이다.

□ 주제어: 광역행정, 광역 거버넌스, 분권화

This research considers regionalism over efficiency and effectiveness for delivering of public goods and services in U.S. metropolitan areas. There are conflicts between localism and regionalism for delivering of public goods and services in U.S. metropolitan areas because the regions are composed of many competitive and overlapping local governments. Even though public choice theorists argue that the local government competition of U.S. metropolitan areas brings markets efficiency to public service delivery, the metropolitan regions are under considerable pressure to integrate delivery of public goods and services with efficiency and interregional equity. Regionalists argue that the highly political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan regions makes equitable and efficient delivery of public goods and services difficult because economic competitiveness is undermined by local fiscal inequality (Frug, 1998; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Therefore, this study explores the problem of political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas, regionalism, and the case of Chicago regional governance for enhancing delivery of public goods and services on effectiveness and efficiency. These findings have encouraged additional research that helps clarify and understand the importance of regional governance for cooperating or coordinating the local governments with the highly political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas.

□ Keywords: Regionalism, Regional Governance, Political Fragmentation

I . Introduction

There is a need to currently explore regionalism against political fragmentation in U.S. metropolitan regional settings because the metropolitan

areas are under considerable pressure to integrate delivery of public goods and services on efficiency and interregional equity. The pressures now require local governments to move toward considering efficiency and equity for delivering public goods and services in U.S. metropolitan areas. However, suburbanization leads U.S. metropolitan areas to the highly political fragmentation because U.S. metropolitan areas are divided by many competitive and overlapping local governments having different governing structures. The suburbanization of U.S. metropolitan areas with the highly political fragmentation makes difficult for equitable and efficient delivery of public goods and services (Fung, 1998; Warner and Hefetz, 2002). Therefore, regionalism is an alternative to increase efficiency and to reduce inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas because it can cooperate or coordinate the number of local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas (Warner and Hefetz, 2002).

In general, regionalism such as streamlined regional government and consolidated functions has become increasingly important in the context of recent public desires for either consolidating or integrating the delivery of public goods and services in U.S. metropolitan areas because the severe economic competitiveness among local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas is harmful for delivering public goods and services (Fung, 2000; Warner and Hefetz, 2002). Therefore, regionalism against the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation have enhanced delivery of public goods and services on equity, efficiency, and competition (Downs 1994; Orfield, 1997). However, the resistance to regionalism in the local political process still exists largely for a matter of the self-interest of local leaders such as local elected officials (Briffault, 2000). Even so, debates over between political fragmentation and regionalism continue.

In this context, this study primarily attempts to explore the debating on political fragmentation, the changes of regionalism, and a specific case of Chicago metropolitan governance. Then, this research provides policy makers abundant information to address the positive consequence of regional

governance that could integrate delivery of public goods and services on efficiency and equity in U.S. metropolitan area.

II. Debating on Suburbanization with Political Fragmentation

1. Political Fragmentation

The political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas is a definition used to create the number of local governments in the meaning of local decentralization. The political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas stems from suburbanization due to the population migration from the central cities to the suburbs in U.S. metropolitan areas (Mookherjee et al., 2006: 30). The relationship between suburbanization and political fragmentation has become a topic of research and study during the past decades. That is, the political fragmentation is a basic unit of analysis and understanding the suburbanization in U.S. metropolitan areas because people move to suburbs and create political entities for enhancing their lives. The features of political fragmentation consist of thousands of cities, including most counties in the U.S. metropolitan areas.

People migrate to the suburbs of U.S. metropolitan areas to seek better lives with low density and for better educational opportunities for their children. That is, suburbanization due to the population migration leads U.S. metropolitan areas to the highly political fragmentation. The highly political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas relates the constant racial transition and economic segregation (Miller and Tucker, 1998). That is, there have been the major demographic changes between the 1960's and the 1980's in U.S. metropolitan areas. The suburbanization pushes residents to the suburbs in

U.S. metropolitan areas. Geography research indicates that cities have spilled over to the peripheral rural areas for human settlement, and the distinction between urban and rural area has transformed the “hybrid form” of region in U.S. metropolitan areas (Mookherjee et al., 2006: 29). Fulton et al. (2001) report that the population migration in U.S. metropolitan areas consumes land faster than the population growth; thus, the feature of political fragmentation is occurring in U.S. metropolitan areas.

A feature of the suburbanization with political fragmentation was shown as a growth in the number of local governments in U.S. metropolitan areas (Miller and Tucker, 1998). The economic and political isolation of poor minorities in U.S. metropolitan areas is caused by the suburbanization such as white flight, or sprawl, and fragmentation (Burchell et al., 2005). The movement further away from the central cities to the suburbs is the suburbanization with political fragmentation. The effect of the creation of legislative rigid boundaries, which separate local governments from each other and more importantly from the central core, is the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation. Therefore, U.S. metropolitan areas are undergoing profound geo-political changes, driven by structural racial and economic segregation in these days. For example, the Chicago metropolitan areas are highly politically fragmented. The size of the Chicago metropolitan area extended by 46 percent while its population grew by only 4 percent. Therefore, the suburbanization with the number of local governments extend over the land of the Chicago metropolitan areas (Burchell et al. 2005).

2. Pros for Political Fragmentation

The residents of suburbs concern about their property values when new apartment complex will be coming to their areas. Most suburbs usually excluded the buildings of apartments with the poor. Although this did not mean that apartments could not be constructed, zoning code requires apartment builders

to maximize for opposition (Swanstrom, 2001). Therefore, these conditions will be bringing economic segregation in metropolitan areas.

Local governments attract people who try to find the better qualities of public goods and services in U.S metropolitan areas. That is, people can choose cities for their benefits because rich local governments can provide the better public goods and services for upper-middle taxpayers within the territorial limits. The better public goods and services will be the advantages of the competitive systems of the highly political fragmentation in U.S metropolitan areas (Parks, et al., 1993). Therefore, Anas (1999) advocates the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation because of producing local economic competitiveness for providing the provision of public goods and services by a given territorial communities in U.S. metropolitan areas. That is, the suburbanization makes the highly political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas to be inducing economic competitiveness to attract people in their territorial areas (Parks et al., 1993).

Most urban researchers frequently cite the Tiebout Model in terms of “vote with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956: 419) to explain the suburbanization with the highly fragmented cities in U.S metropolitan areas. According to Tiebout hypothesis, political fragmentation simulates competition, creates incentives for efficiency and responsiveness, and should therefore lower spending. That is, the citizens in fragmented government settings will be more informed about public goods and services than those in centralized government settings. Tiebout argues that if residents want to move from a city to another city, they consider of local services and goods such as school system, crime rate, tax rate, environment, and neighborhood (pp. 416-424). Therefore, local governments will be competing each other to attract people who try to find the better qualities of public goods and services because people think of their movements for gaining the benefits in U.S metropolitan areas (Briffault, 2004).

Advocates of the suburbanization point out that Americans have a chance to choose between low-density suburban living and the highly-density urban

living. The advocates argue that the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation also decreases social inequity because the suburbanization reduces the part of social inequity from housing consumption gap between blacks and whites in U.S. metropolitan areas. According to 1997 American Housing Survey data, the suburbanization shrinks the gap in unit size and ownership rates between blacks and whites because a larger source of land of U.S. metropolitan areas is used (U.S. Census Bureau). Also, Burchell et al. (2005, 129) argue that the suburbanization allows people to possess larger units and build larger houses because of inexpensive house prices. They cite a study that analyzes home prices in Los Angeles in 1990. A one mile spread in distance from CBD (Central Business District) would cut the price of houses by 6 percent. That is, the suburbanization has been the influential and lucrative mechanism for reducing the problem of housing price and ownership in U.S. metropolitan areas. As a source of collective identity, scholars' arguments for the benefits over the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation still exist.

3. Cons for Political Fragmentation

The suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation over U.S metropolitan areas makes long distance among homes, jobs, and shopping centers. The suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation spreads large amounts of land over the U.S metropolitan areas: that is, the suburbanization leads the expanding the land of U.S. metropolitan areas through developing open spaces and farmlands because they turn into residential areas. Accordingly, the U.S metropolitan areas are under the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation (Burchell et al. 2005).

U.S. metropolitan physical expansion encourages people to use cars due to the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation. Therefore, the physical expansion of U.S. metropolitan areas creates long commuting times. According

to the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI, 2004), the suburbanization of U.S. metropolitan areas makes people more and more dependent on driving in their daily lives because it sets long distance between homes and jobs. TTI states that higher congestion levels extend more time than in the past to commute in very large population areas. According to the report, even though average commute time was 20 minutes in 1982, the commute time was extended by 28 minutes in 2001.

Burchell et al. (2005) state that the causes of traffic congestion in the U.S. metropolitan areas have been the suburbanization and the increase in driving because the rapid growth of suburban population was 12.5 percent in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, they argue that the suburban areas of U.S metropolitan areas rapidly urbanized undergo the heavy traffic congestions due to most of the population migration in the U.S metropolitan areas from 1980s to 2000s. Because most suburban residents are heavily dependent on cars to access job and shopping centers, the suburbanization of U.S. metropolitan areas is rapidly worsening traffic congestion with long travel time. However, Gordon and Richardson (1997) support the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation because the suburbanization will particularly solve traffic congestions: that is, firms and companies with labors move to suburban areas. Therefore, many workers don't spend long travel time to commute to work places because the suburbanization let them to enjoy short commutes in time. However, TTI points out that long travel time is the problem of suburbanization.

The population migration from inner cities to suburbs has also pressured the number of local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas to provide new infrastructure such as highways and roads for new residents. That is, the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation spreads residents out over sparse developments far away from the inner cities. The number of local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas spend millions of dollars to build new roads, new water and sewer lines, new schools and increased police and fire

protection at the expense of the needs of new suburban residents (Ciscel, 2001, 409-410). Consequently, Warner and Hefetz (2002) state that the sprawling city necessitates expanding infrastructures such as roads and schools to meet the need of new suburban residents. According to Burchell et al. (2005), the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation raises infrastructure costs. They refer to a Florida case study to show that providing utilities spent more 40 percent per dwelling unit in a sprawled city than in a compact development city; roads spent cost 60 percent more per dwelling unit. That is, the suburbanization encourages spending tax monies to meet the need of suburban residents to build new infrastructures (p. 50-51). That is, the current the highly political fragmentation has more harmful things to the number of local governments of U.S metropolitan areas because the problems of the costs of infrastructure such as highways, roads, sewer, and water plants for new residents still exist (Miller and Tucker, 1998).

4. The Necessity of Regionalism

The suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation generates a never-ending upward spiral of costs of growth. If the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation is so desirable, why should Americans accept anything else? That is reason why people don't want to spend tax monies for the infrastructure to build up further out of U.S metropolitan areas. The suburbanization development causes deterioration at the inner cities' centers in U.S. metropolitan areas (Swanstrom, 2001). The central cities suffer from both a diminished tax base due to population and business losses. Also, the number of local governments spend tax monies to build new roads, highways, and schools to meet the need of new suburban residents (Burchell et al. 2005). The suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation continues to seek new lands for real estate developments. Even though people movement to suburbs is usually individual freedom over political equality, the costs of the

suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation extend beyond the realm of fiscal disparities among the number of local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas. That is, the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation is increasingly responding to other costs such as economic segregation, worsening traffic congestion, overcrowded schools, and diminished open space (Miller and Tucker, 1998).

Analyses of the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation give regional or metropolitan policy makers the points of view of the current land use policy and planning of U.S. metropolitan areas (Fulton et al., 2001). That is, the debates of the suburbanization can provide insights into the current regional or metropolitan policy and practice, explaining the origins of institutions, techniques, and documents with the concerns of policy makers in U.S. metropolitan areas. Due to the suburbanization, the growing spatial isolation of the urban poor and the continued exodus of middle class families make the larger patterns of urban growth in the U.S. metropolitan areas. The suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas relates the cost of metropolitan growth with providing new infrastructure for new residents. It is really difficult to solve the costs of metropolitan growth without fundamental regional policies (Fulton et al., 2001).

Although the profound impacts of the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation are still debated in many scholars' arguments, in the light of the problems about the suburbanization with the highly political fragmentation, regionalism will be an answer in solving the those problems in U.S. metropolitan area (Fulton et al., 2001; Burchell et al., 2005).

III. Regionalism: Regional Coalitions of U.S. Metropolitan Areas

1. Regionalism

Regionalism involves redistributing the wealth, which could decrease the amount of conflict among the number of local governments of U.S. metropolitan areas. Moreover, regionalism places more control at local government level and works to ensure that people have certain basic equal amenities such as transportation policy (Norris, 2001). In the 1960s the federal government was trying to promote regional governments such as COGs (Council of Governments) and MPOs (Metropolitan Planning Organizations). Regional governments are more efficient than local governments if a regional government is coordinating the efforts in the matters of regional transportation housing and growth patterns in U.S. metropolitan areas (Downs 1994). That is, the dominant approach in efficiency today is regionalism for delivery of public goods and services. If regional governments are becoming stakeholders with handling waste management and water systems, efficiency will be potential for saving in regional delivery of public goods and services (Pinch and Patterson, 2000).

The highly fragmented governments in U.S. metropolitan areas relate economic segregation that affects both people's ability to get a job and their overall level of income. The economic segregation has also made local economic inequality more entrenched, with families mired in poverty from one generation to the next (Swanstrom, 2001). The key link in these situations is the perpetuation of economical inequalities generated through the local funding of public goods and services in U.S. metropolitan areas. Even though local governments want to provide good qualities of public goods and services widely within their legislative areas, the lack of the fund for public goods and services

just brings the economic segregation boundaries in U.S. metropolitan areas (Dreier, Mollenkope, and Swanstrom, 2002). Local government's competition in U.S. metropolitan areas result in unequal provision of local public goods and services (Ostrom and Bish, 1988).

However, Norris (2001) argues that there were too many political barriers to make it a viable solution. That is, regionalism does not seem to be a politically feasible option due to local political resistance (Gainsborough, 2001). Public choice theorists assert that regionalism is inefficient, because local governments competing for local resources is the best way to maximize efficiency in U.S. metropolitan areas. That is, the lack of competition on the quality of public goods and services is common complaints (Sclar, 2000). Also, advocates of the decentralization of power to U.S. metropolitan areas argue that the highly political fragmentation promotes local efficiency in the provision of public services, democratic citizenship, and self-determination by territorial communities because it permits public policy decisions to match distinctive local conditions. (Ostrom and Bish, 1988; Briffault, 2004). That is, local governments can efficiently provide their public goods and services for the needs and desires of their taxpayers (Parks and Oakerson, 1993; Anas, 2000).

Those arguments for the decentralization of power to U.S. metropolitan areas is serious undermined by regionalism (Wallis, 1996). Local autonomy supporters generally offer no solution to the co-operation problems such as cleaner air and economic inefficiencies associated with economic development competition. Local actions often produce external economies and dis-economies in U.S. metropolitan areas where borders between municipalities are less relevant. The critics of public choice perspective on small cities' capacity argued that they were too small to achieve economies of scale. For example, even though libraries and parks benefit the entire region, they would be underfunded if locally provided. For another example, a critical local land use or exclusionary zoning operates to increase the cost of mobility in U.S. metropolitan areas. It denies many people the opportunities to move into a place because they cannot

afford the higher housing costs produced by local regulation (Wallis, 1996). Local governments also suffer from rigid economic boundaries that reinforce economic segregation in metropolitan areas (Judd and Swanstrom, 2004). It is difficult for local governments with economic struggles to provide delivery of public goods and services for residents in U.S. metropolitan areas.

Economic segregation or, discrimination has harmed the vital of local integrated communities and equity in U.S. metropolitan areas because the rich will always distance themselves from the poor in societies with private housing markets. Therefore, economic segregation undermines equal opportunity; that is, economic segregation significantly promotes economic inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas (Dreier, Mollenkope, and Swanstrom, 2002). Also, the economic segregation boundaries make it easier to isolate the poor local governments with similar economic and social backgrounds in U.S. metropolitan areas (Fung, 1998). Regionalism has contended that local government's competition in metropolitan areas result in unequal provision of local public goods and services. The equity agenda includes identifying and alleviating disparities of resource allocation with U.S. metropolitan areas (Provo, 2002).

U.S. Metropolitan areas usually lack formal legal or political existence; however, the metropolitan areas are real economic, social, and ecological units (Briffault, 2004). The delivery of public services and goods on inequity and inefficiency have been criticized resulting in part from the highly fragmented municipal governments in U.S. metropolitan areas (Fung, 2000). Provision of public services and goods by some form of regional government has been promoted on equity, efficiency and economic competitiveness grounds (Downs, 1994; Orfield, 1997). Therefore, regional governments reduce negative externalities or spill-over effects produced by uncontrolled development within governmentally fragmented U.S. metropolitan areas. Regional governments can provide fiscal and other forms of regional delivery of public services and goods on efficiency and equity in U.S. metropolitan areas (Norris, 2001).

2. Regional Coalitions of U.S. Metropolitan Areas

Using Minneapolis-Saint Paul as an example, Myron Orfield discusses that the chaos such as urban decline, inner-suburban decay, and suburbanization did not stop neatly at central-city borders but spread into working-class inner-ring suburbs. Minnesota's Twin Cities became the rapid blighted region during the 1980s. By 1994, both central cities of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan areas were struggling under an uneven share of concentrated poverty and racial segregation. Crime and joblessness soared. In the poorest neighborhoods of the Twin Cities, violent crime rates were 10 times the metro average, and 30 times the suburban average (Orfield, 1997).

Orfield mentions that the political struggle goes together with the creation of the nation's most significant regional government and the enactment of land use, fair housing, and tax-equity reform legislation. Orfield has attacked these metropolitan problems with a regional agenda, and argues that a regional coalition with efficiency and equity can be built in the Twin Cities. Orfield suggests the property tax-base sharing for breaking the mismatch between social needs and property tax-based resources in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan areas. Orfield's analysis became part of the basis for forming a regional coalition of fiscally distressed center-city and inner-suburban jurisdictions in Minneapolis-St. Paul. The regional coalition can be better understanding the regional economy in order to delivery public goods and services strategies linking regional employers with workers in local communities. The regional coalition can efficiently deliver public goods and services regionally (Provo, 2002).

Gainsborough (2001) explores regional cooperation by comparing annexation policies in the cities of Houston, TX and Los Angeles, CA. She selected these cities based on their similar sizes and location within the Sunbelt region. Both cities were also among the most populous and fastest growing cities in the United States. In addition to her concern for regional cooperation, Gainsborough

was also interested in the role of state government. By conducting interviews with local, state and regional officials. Gainsborough was able to identify impediments to regional cooperation.

Regional cooperation will be difficult without citizen support or political support (Gainsborough, 2001). Houston was able to maintain the control of suburban areas within its jurisdiction because the city had strong annexation powers. Even though the citizens within those areas had the desire to cooperate with Houston, they feared the Houston's full annexation power. In Los Angeles, a full vote by the citizens to be annexed was required prior to annexation. The full vote requirement stripped Los Angeles of any power over suburban areas and undercut any incentives for regional cooperation. Political support from state or regional agencies increased regional cooperation. When the state or regional agency provided support in the way of funding or planning decisions, communities were more likely to engage in regional cooperation because the use of state and federal level rules to promote regionalism may be difficult in the face of strong political opposition from local governments (Gainsborough, 2001). Therefore, until incentives are provided from higher levels of government or sanctions exist for those that do not participate such as annexation it is unlikely that regional cooperation will exist among cities.

3. New Regionalism: Regional Governance

New regionalism that suggests regional "governance" rather than regional "government." Regional governance refers to voluntary horizontal or inter-local cooperation (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). If one was asked the meaning of the term governance, most would say that it means to govern. However, it is mostly used to show that governing is no longer part of the traditional hierarchical model of sovereign control over the people (Frederickson, 1999). Government was readily understood as formal institutions of the state with legitimate coercive power over citizens. Citizens started to experience this change from a more

hierarchical to cooperative government in the provision of public goods services as a result of the public management movement of 1970s (Frederickson, 1999). Therefore, new regionalism assume that suburbs will voluntarily aid for the recovering of central cities. However, “there is. . . little evidence that municipal governments will agree voluntarily to contribute their own property tax revenues to services from which they or their taxpayers do not expect to benefit” (Friskin and Norris, 2001: 475).

Swanstrom (2001) explores current literature in an attempt to answer whether fragmented governments harm economic growth and whether or not suburbs are dependent on central cities for their economic survival. To improve the U.S metropolitan areas, local governments can cede power to new regional governments or work toward a more collaborative effort- a sort of regional governance. Even though there is no clear indication that “more unified governance structures will enhance the economic growth and incomes of regions” Swanstrom’s research provides opposing arguments for the fragmentation of local governments and the interdependence of cities and suburbs (Swanstrom, 2001: 484). On the issue of suburbanization, suburbs are performing more and more functions typically left to central cities. However, he also indicates that central cities have been at a disadvantage because of transportation improvements and affordable housing. Therefore, Swanstrom (2001) supports an approach to regional governance that provides spillover benefits to both the central city and suburban areas (Warner and Hefetz, 2002).

New regionalists argue that regional governance structures will enhance delivery of public good and services in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, while the highly fragmented regions have lagged behind in Boston (Swanstrom, 2001). The new regionalists emphasize not only that more collaborative regional governance structure will improve local services but also they will enhance the competitiveness of regions in the global economy as well. That is, the argument for the delivery of public goods and services of greater regional cooperation is plausible. For example, the Greater Vancouver Regional District is to proffer a

working model of regional governance because it consists of a governing board composed of local representatives that can vote for regional issues according to the size of the population (Frisken and Norris, 2001). Regional governance is to integrate public goods and services on efficiency and intra-regional equity to achieve economies of scale (Warner and Hefetz, 2002).

New Regionalism is becoming popular as a regional governance replaces a regional government as political entity despite its weaker structure in U.S. metropolitan areas. Proponents of new regionalism (Downs 1994; Orfield, 1997; Rusk, 2003) contend that regional governance can solve many of the urban problems that are currently barriers to socially sustainable communities. Regional governance would include regional efforts at providing affordable housing, mixed-income housing, high density development and attempts to decrease the fragmentation and polarization in U.S. metropolitan areas (Downs 1994; Sander 2002). Downs (1994) illustrates that the uneven growth policies of one city impacts the housing prices of other cities; therefore, it makes sense to have some regional cooperation in order to provide benefits for everyone. Presumably, regional governance would help desegregate cities, promote growth policies, reduce traffic congestion and negative health effects, and redistribute finances and even the playing field (Orfield 1998; Rusk, 2003).

IV. The Case of Chicago Metropolitan

1. Background for the Chicago Metropolitan Area

This section explores a history and political culture for an analysis of regional governance in the Chicago metropolitan area because these factors is significant in analyzing and understanding the Chicago regionalism. Therefore, this analysis includes the political and historical backgrounds and recent efforts in

regional governance in the Chicago metropolitan area. These information for this section was acquired from reports and publications on the Chicago regional issues.

The Chicago metropolitan area is the highly political fragmentation area. The region consists of more than 940 local governments with taxing authority. The city of Chicago dominated the metropolitan region politically and economically. Also, the city of Chicago's population dominance maintained until the middle of 20th century. However, the population of the Chicago metropolitan area was almost evenly divided by the central city and suburbs in 1970s. As Table 1 shows, the city of Chicago maintained only a third of the Chicago metropolitan area population; therefore, the city had faced with local economic problems because of the decline of the population.

<Table 1> Population of Chicago and Suburbs in the Chicago Metropolitan Area

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2007
Chicago	3,550,000	3,369,000	3,005,000	2,784,000	2,896,000	2,836,000
Suburbs	2,671,000	3,628,000	4,421,000	4,627,000	5,377,000	6,688,000
Total	6,221,000	6,997,000	7,246,000	7,411,000	8,273,000	9,524,000
Percentage suburbs/Total	43%	52%	59%	62%	65%	70%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, (2000) and State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, Updates (as of February 4, 2009)

<Table 1> indicates that the Chicago metropolitan urban sprawl creates severe loss of central city population from 1980-90s because of worsening of certain adverse conditions such as poverty, crime, broken families, drug abuse, unemployment, deteriorated structures and abandoned buildings, and poor quality of public schools and other local services in the Chicago metropolitan area. There is no a single explanation. One strong approach is that shifting in

the economic base from the central city to its suburbs (Swanstrom, 2001). People want to run away from older areas that relied heavily on traditional industry. Emergence of “newly” industrial areas is based on high-technology industries and knowledge based industries; that is, deindustrialization where manufacturing moved to suburban and rural areas because of cheaper land, labor and the absence of labor unions. Also, the federal government through adopting policies for more highway constructions supported the movement of manufacturing. Therefore, people in the Chicago metropolitan area moved to their suburban cities for employments and better lives (Swanstrom, 2001).

Rusk (2003) mentions that about 70 percent of the population of metropolitan areas lived in their central cities in the 1950s, and over 60 percent of the population of metropolitan areas have lived in their neighboring cities until now. Due to the trend of Chicago metropolitan population, the both the central cities and their suburbs within the metropolitan areas are tightly joined and potentially challenged by changes such a rapid population growth, poverty, and local economic conditions. However, Chicago was not interested in regional reform due to the political dominance in the state legislature: therefore, Chicago didn't need to expand their boundaries as well and capture their suburban growth through annexation and consolidation. Even though Chicago boundary may be frozen and surrounded by rapid growing neighboring cities, the central city retains downtown business district as a perceived regional employment center.

However, it occurs the central city's loss of power in state politics due to the trend of Chicago metropolitan population movement of people in 1990s (Weir, 1996). According to Ferman (1996), Chicago managed the agenda of the state legislature to meet to the needs of Chicago. Also, Chicago used the power in the state legislature to take resources away from the needs of suburbs. Therefore, the suburban legislators of the Chicago metropolitan area were more united against the Chicago's insolence toward the suburban needs. As a result of redistricting the 1990 census, the majority legislators in the state legislative

body were suburban Republicans in 1994. The legislature introduced various bills to limit power from the Chicago boards. Also, the legislature disregarded Chicago Mayor Daley's requests for special legislation to authorizing casino gambling in the land of Chicago but approved a number of licences for floating casino. The state legislature obstructed the Mayor Daley's initiative for a new regional airport on the South Side. Chicago was politically isolated in the state legislature in 1994. This conflict between Chicago and the state legislature was not improved until 1998. Therefore, relations between Chicago and the suburbs have been difficult to bridge in the different needs of the central city and suburban cities.

As the political climate changed, Chicago Mayor, Daley tried to reach out suburban local political leaders to solve Chicago issues to obtain political influence in the state legislature. Even though the Chicago metropolitan area appears to have less stable or nonexistent regional regime. He felt the benefits of unified areas to discuss regional issues together other suburban political leaders in economic development. Mayor Daley saw that Chicago is more responsible of metropolitan areas change through regional alliance in common with other mayors for improving Chicago metropolitan problems such as racial and economic segregation, local government fiscal imbalances, and development sprawl.

2. Regional Efforts for the Chicago Metropolitan Area

Chicago metropolitan Region is composed of many competitive and overlapping local governments having different governing structures. Even though the Chicago metropolitan areas move toward considering efficiency and equity in delivering public goods and services, the highly political fragmentation makes equitable and efficient delivery of public goods and services difficult. Also, Chicago has been little interest to need regional coalition because Chicago dominated the metropolitan region and the state legislature. For example, the


Regional Transportation Authority was created in 1974. However, this Authority was built as the result of Chicago Transportation Authority's needs in operation (Pearson, 1999).

There are two major regional agencies in the Chicago metropolitan areas. The Northeastern Illinois planning Commission(NIPC) for regional growth management and comprehensive land-use planning and the Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC) for research and planning. Even though NIPC is a state-established planning agency, NIPC doesn't have any power over the metropolitan local governments. Also, MPC as a business-backed civic agency researches for its policy agenda for legislative and administrative action. Also, there are nine suburban Council of Governments (COGs) - the DuKane Valley Mayors & Administrators, DuPage Mayors and Managers Conference, Lake County Municipal League, McHenry County Council of Governments, Northwest Municipal Conference, South Suburban Mayors & Managers Association, Southwest Conference of Mayors, West Central Municipal Conference and Will County Governmental League - in the Chicago metropolitan area. However, there is no COG to cover the entire metropolitan area. Regionalism is not hot issue in the Chicago metropolitan area. Therefore, the unconcern to regional alliance in the political process is largely a matter of the self-interest of Chicago elected leaders. However, the proliferation of suburban governments and the population movement to suburbs brought Chicago's loss of power in state politics.

Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley recommended an regional coalition for a new spirit of cooperation among the Chicago metropolitan area's municipalities several years ago. The Metropolitan Mayor Caucus (MMC) was established in 1997 as an informal regional alliance to cover the entire Chicago metropolitan area. MMC is to unite mayors from the six-county region in regional issues; that is, MMC provides the greater interests of the Chicago regional members beyond the boundaries of local interests. Today, it is an regional governance for collaboration and coordination between Chicago and the suburban COGs. MMC

is a regional governance for the different perspectives that all the local governments bring to the forum regarding important regional public policy issues. All mayors belong to each COG and the COGs hire the director of each COG. Although the result of Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley initiative brought together a meeting of mayors representing the Chicago region's nine suburban municipal associations, the MMC has grown in size, strength, and accomplishment on task forces with the commitment of suburban mayors and the directors of COGs.

<Figure 1> The Metropolitan Mayor Caucus



272 mayors now make up the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus. The Caucus has addressed major issues in Table 2 and has made a huge difference in the areas of environment, critical infrastructure, economic development, housing, emergency preparedness, legislation, ground transportation funding, education funding, water issues, and so much more.

<Table 2> The Main Issues of Metropolitan Mayors Caucus (MMC)

Issues	Functions of MMC
Clean Air Counts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant Opportunities Available through Clean Air Counts, • Lawn Care Buyback Events Gas Can Replacement Events, • Diesel Retrofits
Critical Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of the local electric infrastructure in the event of a power disruption • Protection of other critical infrastructures, including natural gas, potable water, and telecommunications.
Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a strategy that would provide guidance to our municipalities on how they could cooperate to promote economic development opportunities throughout the region. • Retail 1-2-3 is a toolkit for local elected and appointed officials, citizen leaders, and the development community to help attract and retain valuable businesses
Emergency Preparedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal preparations for disasters of all types and on all scales have been given the highest priority. • Closer cooperation between local and federal public safety entities
Housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidance on many of the issues surrounding housing, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How to assess a community's true demand for housing of all types and price points - Identifying ways to bring higher quality housing into areas with a preponderance of lower value homes - Dealing with aging rental properties in need of new management or rehabilitation - Ensuring that new developments meet community needs, and are well-managed - Identifying private and public sector resources to advance housing goals. - Partnerships as part of the housing preservation/creation process - Finding resources to support local efforts
Legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making recommendations to the MMC on the legislative priorities, which should be addressed annually. • On critical legislative issues, the Committee also tries to leverage the political influence of the region's mayors to raise quality of life and improve the well being of everyone in the Chicago region.

Ground Transportation Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a joint strategy that will result in an increased share of federal funds to the State of Illinois • MMC has created a Ground Transportation Task Force charged with developing a proactive funding strategy
Education Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MMC's Education Reform Committee spent last year focused on turning its twin guiding principles, funding reform and fiscal accountability, into real change for education in Illinois.
Water Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learn about best management practices for storm water controls for high-level decision-makers, such as Planning Commissioners and Board Members, with the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus' Storm Water Best Management Practices brochure.

The following issues represent the Chicago region priorities for MMC. In keeping with the functions of the issues, MMC deal with challenges that impact the quality of life for over 8 million people in our 273 municipalities of Chicago region. That is, when there is consensus in the Chicago metropolitan region, Metropolitan Mayors Caucus (MMC) can has a powerful voice and force for change, can make programs and can support legislation to improve their metropolitan overall quality of life. Also, MMC can increase federal funding to meet critical needs. The federal funding can maintain transit, highway and safety programs of Chicago region. Therefore, MMC continues to lead the cooperative sub-allocation of funds to municipalities, counties and transportation agencies across the Chicago metropolitan region. Even though the different perspectives with all the independent municipalities bring to the Chicago metropolitan region, MMC can work together for consensus on the metropolitan key issues as a whole.

3. Private Sector Efforts for the Chicago Metropolitan Area

Chicago Metropolis is a civic agency - a membership organization of leading area business and civic leaders - to implement the metropolis projects sponsored

by the Commercial Club of Chicago that was founded in 1877 in order "to advance the public welfare and the commercial interests of metropolitan Chicago by co-operative effort, social intercourse, and a free interchange of views" (Johnson, 1999). Metropolis' governing board and executive officers represent the business elite of the Chicago metropolitan region. They have connected with both the political and business communities at the high levels. They are currently recommending and working on numerous issues to the metropolitan social and economic well-being around five areas in Table 3, such as public education and child care; transportation, land use, and the environment; neighborhoods and housing; governance, the economy.

<Table 3> Recommendations from Chicago Metropolis 2020 Report

Public Education and Child Care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve public school to ensure more accountability by local school districts - Create more equitable funding for education - Enhance school choice - Increase business support of childcare costs
Transportation, Land Use, and Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve and expand the public transit system - Develop intermodal freight centers linked by dedicated freight ways - Protect and enhance open a space and natural HABITAT
Neighborhoods and Housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve housing mobility for the poor through the existing federal Section 8 and voucher program - Support employer-assisted housing development - Enforce fair housing laws
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a regional coordinating council to develop land use, coordinate infrastructure development, consolidate the regional plans - Encourage intergovernmental cooperation - Create a task force to study consolidation of special districts and townships
Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restore inner-city economic activity - Develop programs to enhance the region, for example, a high technology center - Expand business involvement in economic development programs

The Chicago Metropolis is purposely created to be, not a planning organization or a policy think tank, but an action-oriented agency. That is, this organization involves in Chicago metropolitan issues through additional access to political decision-makers. The main point of the Chicago Metropolis 2020 Report demanded for the creation of a new organization as a new kind of "civic entrepreneurship" to collaborate with other organizations in the Chicago metropolitan region. That is, the Chicago Metropolis continues the process started by the Commercial Club and is implementing those recommendations contained in the specific ideas such as low density sprawl, concentration of poor minorities, the spatial mismatch between jobs, affordable housing and transportation; tax; health care; public safety; land use; and disparate degrees of access to quality education. More than 200 members of the Commercial Club has examined those issues in an executive council including representatives from business, labor, civic, religious and governmental organizations. The executive council has consulted with experts and met with regional community, civic and government representatives.

However, the Metropolis' recommendations was controversial because their some recommendations were resisted by political leaders. For example, many suburban political leaders are skeptical about the Metropolis' goal of regional tax sharing and the relinquishment of municipal powers, and they openly are against a regional coordinating body. Therefore, they opposed to a Chicago based-solutions for the Chicago metropolitan region. On the one hand, a major criticism of the Metropolis is that it has not represented adequately to the overall Chicago regional commercial members because it is controlled by the Chicago-based business community. Therefore, the Metropolis as a business-driven nature of organization, was designed for supporting business community for the Chicago metropolitan issues.

The Chicago Metropolis is fundamentally a bottom-up approach to the Chicago regional governance. The problems of current regional policy result from a lack of a powerful voice for business, labor, and civic organizations, a discrepancy in

evaluating of economic and environmental values, and lack of a rational approach to regional policy. Also, it is difficult for regional governance of top-down to carry out the legal and technical command and control structure adopted by all mainline governmental organizations. When combined with a political theory of governance, the evaluation of participatory regional policy at the civic level becomes essential. The Chicago Metropolis is doing more to protect the metropolitan social and economic well-being at the civic level. In particular, the Chicago Metropolis focuses on the incorporation of participatory mechanisms, and the perceived influence of citizens and businesses on the regional policy process. Also, the Chicago Metropolis requires a level of adaptability and flexibility to Chicago regional policies because it departs from what has become the regional tenet in important ways. The Chicago Metropolis as a civic organization does not mean regional divestiture in Chicago regional socio-economic issues; therefore, the civic organization incorporate regional governance in a manner that integrates regional community matters.

V. Conclusion and Policy Implications

The traditional centralized command and control approach to regional problems has not been effective, leaving behind "unfinished business" the regional socio-economic issues still without effective solutions (DeWitt, 1994). Regional governance means that citizens, communities, and businesses in partnership with government design their own solutions to regional problems close to bottom-up, rather than passively accepting top-down style by regulators.

The highly fragmented local governments in Chicago metropolitan area are related to economic inequality generated through the local funding of public goods and services. Also, local autonomy supporters have generally offered no

solution to the co-operation problems such as transportation, environmental problem and economic inefficiencies associated with Chicago regional issues. Frug (1999) argues that the delivery of public services and goods have been criticized for inequity and inefficiency, resulting in part from the highly fragmented municipal governments in metropolitan areas (Briffault, 2004). Therefore, the highly fragmented local governments in the Chicago metropolitan area result in unequal provision of local public goods and services. Also, the city of Chicago was generally not incorporated for the regional issues. However, the mayor of Chicago needs the supports of suburban political leaders to solve Chicago problems to obtain political influence in the state legislature because the trend of Chicago metropolitan population movement of people in 1990s. The mayor of Chicago recognized the benefits of unified areas for improving Chicago metropolitan problems such as racial and economic segregation, local government fiscal imbalances, and development sprawl together other suburban political leaders because the Chicago metropolitan areas are real economic, social, and ecological units.

A model of the Chicago regional governance is demanded to deal with the incorporation among local governments and the participation of civic organizations for solving the regional problems. The central idea explaining the Chicago regional governance is that in some cases, the Chicago Metropolis and Metropolitan Mayors Caucus (MMC) will organize on their own to find regional solutions, without being forced to do so by the state and federal government. The Chicago regional governance as a new regionalism is that metropolitan reform without local governments' competition brings more good public goods and services. New regionalists advocates the Chicago regional governance that broadens the debate to include sociological and political values for regional cooperation. It adopted similar consultative approach to regional governance.

However, most Americans fear that their freedom of choice will be lost because the proliferation of suburban governments and the population movement to suburbs is usually individual freedom over political equality and choice. Also,

the main weakness of regionalism is that it does not work well the current politics of the urban environment, especially given the local autonomy of cities because U.S. metropolitan area appears to have less stable or nonexistent regional regime. Norris (2001) states that only peripheral or minor issues will be addressed by regional cooperation and that the major issues such as public transportation and growth policies will not be politically feasible. However, regional governance as new regionalism is not restricted to representatives from local governments, business, and civic groups to cope with the main weakness and to enhance the delivery of public services and goods on efficiency and equity in U.S. metropolitan areas.

Regional governance is fundamental to increase efficiency and to reduce inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas. Regional governance can affect the spatial organization of metropolitan area and reduce racial and economic segregation. Even though regional governance aims to alter the inequality values such as economic segregation and promote efficiency for delivering of public goods and services in metropolitan areas, the resistance to regional governance still exists largely in relating the self-interest of local political leaders such as mayors and council members (Briffault, 2000).

Much of the previous research has concentrated only on the economic aspects of fragmented governments and suburbanization. However, this essay has attempted to explore major metropolitan problems through new regionalism as a case of Chicago metropolitan area because it is important to look the overall new regionalism that dominates U.S. metropolitan areas to obtain a richer perspective at the causes of urban decline and the social, physical, cultural, political and economic conditions. Also, this research can provide the information of regional system related to one of main agenda in Korea. That is, this paper can suggest on regionalism in search for efficient, effective, and equitable delivery of public goods and services for the change of Korean local jurisdictions. For the further research, specific more case studies about regional governance have been needed.

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