
Positive and Negative Evaluations of Political Parties : Implications in the American Context-Turnout and Vote Choice

정당에 대한 평가가 선거행태에 미치는 영향

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〈논문요약〉

본 연구를 통해 필자는 선거행태에 나타나는 정당지지성향의 효과를 기존의 시각과는 다른 관점에서 분석하였다. 정당지지성향에 대한 기존의 연구는 정당지지자들이 지지하는 정당에 대한 긍정적 평가의 정도를 주된 설명변수로 인식한데 반해, 본 연구는 유권자 자신이 반대하고 있는 정당에 대한 부정적 평가의 정도도 중요한 설명변수가 됨을 실증적으로 입증코자 하였다. 미국의 의회선거에서 나타난 정당평가의 영향을 분석한 결과, 대통령 선거가 있는 해의 국회의원 선거에서는 반대당에 대한 부정적 평가가 지지당에 대한 긍정적 평가에 상응하는 영향을 투표참여뿐 아니라 투표선택에도 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 놀라운 사실은 중간의회 선거의 경우 반대당에 대한 부정적 평가만이 투표참여와 투표선택에 유의미한 영향이 있다는 것이다. 이는 유권자의 정치적 행태에 있어 부정적 평가가 상당히 중요한 의미를 지닌다는 최근의 주장을 입증한 것이기도 하다.

I. Introduction

It is a distinctive feature of American politics that about two-thirds of the electorate are party identifiers even after party organizations had apparently declined in the middle of the twentieth century. The literature on elections generally assumes that most voters have party attachments that persist through time, affecting votes as well as ideological positions, political cognition, and evaluations of the issues and candidates, all of which in turn affect one's vote (Campbell et al., 1960 : Nie et al., 1976 : Markus and Converse, 1979 : Fiorina, 1981).

Partisanship is clearly a useful concept for interpreting electoral behavior. The important role of partisanship has been widely documented in the study of voting behavior. Not only does the standard party identification (PID) variable appear quite frequently in empirical analyses, but also much research finds it to have a significant impact on the individual's voting behavior.

Despite the central importance of partisanship, little effort has been expended in refining and clarifying the psychological bases of partisanship. *The American Voter* (1960, pp. 121-122) defined party identification as a concept including both the "attracting quality" of a party and the "repelling quality" of a party. Thus, an "individual may develop either positive or negative identification toward a party". Despite this all-inclusive concept, however, the positive aspect of party identification usually receives most of the research attention while the negative aspect is largely neglected in the literature. As a result, votes of party identifiers that are inconsistent with partisanship, which are also of prime concern to researchers, have been explained in terms of short-term factors (e.g., candidates and issues) rather than party-related attitudes.

The emphasis on both in-party positivity and out-party hostility in partisan attitudes in the United States is an important concept, especially in the context of the two-party system in which bipartisan electoral competition has been continued over long periods of time, thus allowing party supporters to develop attitudes toward both in- and out-parties.

Several recent studies suggest that negative evaluations of the opposition party are as good indicators in explaining voting behavior as are positive evaluations of one's own

party, which implies that both have independent impact on partisans' electoral behavior (Maggotto and Piereson, 1977 : Weisberg, 1982 : Scarrow, 1990 : Wattenberg, 1990 : Richardson, 1991). Also, from the viewpoint of retrospective partisanship, partisanship is based on positive or negative judgments about the policy records of the two parties (Fiorina, 1981).

Surprisingly, however, little systematic research has been done in this area concerning partisans' attitudes toward the two political parties (i.e., both positive toward one's own party and negative toward the opposition party) and their electoral consequences. The objective of this analysis is to incorporate both positive and negative aspects of partisanship to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of partisan evaluations of political parties on voting behavior such a turnout and vote choice. The integrated concept of partisanship, embracing both positive and negative attitudes toward the political parties, dictates that partisans' negative evaluations of the opposition party as well as their positive evaluations of their own party should be analyzed separately in studies of electoral behavior. This should prove interesting because few studies have been done comparing two competing aspects in party identification (positive evaluations of one's own party and negative evaluations of the opposition party).

By doing this, we can gain not only increased analytical power to predict partisans' behavior but also improved insight into the conceptualization of PID. In a similar vein, we can overcome PID's failure to provide a substantive answer for partisans' defection in their vote choices as well as for their abstention in turnout. Also, we can enrich our understanding of the effects of evaluations of political parties in different electoral contexts such as presidential year congressional elections and midterm congressional elections. In addition, by comparing these competing factors (i.e., positive evaluations of one's own party and negative evaluations of the opposition party), we can potentially make a strong claim about the significance of partisans' negative evaluations of the opposition party. This would be true if we find the impact of negative evaluations of the opposition party to be significant (even if small in magnitude) in determining their voting behavior. The effect of partisans' negative evaluations of the opposition party on their electoral behavior may provide insight into the apparent importance of negative information and

negative campaigns as well as the theoretical interest in partisanship as a basis for learning heuristic.

II. Hypothesis Settings

In this research on party identification, I focus on the relationship of party evaluations. Naturally, partisans have relatively more favorable attitudes toward their own party than the opposition party. I argue, however, favorable attitudes toward one's own party are not dependent on negative evaluations of the opposition party, though both evaluations may be modestly correlated. In other words, positivity is not the flip-side of negativity.

Hypothesis 1 : *Independent* of evaluations of one's own party, evaluations of the opposition party have significant analytic power in predicting partisans' electoral behavior.

The idea of separating partisan attitudes toward the two political parties(i.e., one's own party and the opposition party) is quite consistent with the original concept of partisan identification. The separation can be justified by three theoretical aspects. First, from an attachment point of view, partisanship is developed based on socio-psychological traditions. The Michigan school regards partisanship as a learning process(Butler and Stokes, 1969, Ch.3 : Converse, 1969). In this process, individuals develop attachments and aversions to political parties. That is, as they learn to organize the political world, they learn to recognize a party as likable, the other as distasteful. However, they are other possibilities as well(Crewe, 1976 : Weisberg, 1982 : Green, 1988). Some individuals may come to like both political parties, while others may look upon both political parties with disdain. And it is also possible that some may strongly like one party but be weakly against the other, or vice versa. In short, many patterns are possible, all resulting from the socialization process.

Second, from the assessment point of view, partisanship is a sum of retrospective(positive and negative) assessments of political parties(Fiorina, 1981). The sources of PID(i.e., political experience) are, of course, varied, so that individuals are likely to differ in

the way they aggregate assessments of the parties into a general PID (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Weisberg, 1982). To put it another way, the process by which partisanship is formed consists of short-term positive and negative evaluations of candidates, issues, and party performance, which may produce separate reactions toward each of the two political parties. For example, suppose a partisan with a PID of the president's party positively evaluate the president's job performance. This may lead him to positively evaluate his party and thus strengthen his PID, but does not necessarily lead him to negatively evaluate the opposition party.

Finally, from the conceptualization point of view, partisanship can be conceptualized as either uni- or multi-dimensional. In the case of uni-dimensional conceptualization of PID, the Democratic and Republican parties are the opposite end of a single dimension. However, some researchers found that the traditional seven-point PID measure is not an equal-interval scale (Fiorina, 1981; Jacoby, 1981). That is, the Democratic and Republican parties may be bipolar reference groups, but the degree to which a partisan positively evaluates his own party may be not the same as the degree to which the partisan negatively evaluates the opposition party. Multidimensionality implies, on the other hand, that the pattern of party evaluations does not reflect a simple in-group/out-group distinctions. Rather, it allows for the possibility that positive feelings for one party may not coincide with negative attitudes toward the other (Crewe, 1976; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Weisberg, 1980, 1982).

Hypothesis 2: Independent of evaluations of one's own party, negative evaluations of the opposition party may have *stronger* effects on turnout and vote choice in the context of midterm congressional elections than in the context of presidential year elections.

It has been argued that partisanship plays a far greater role in congressional elections than in presidential elections. The principal reason for the difference is that congressional voters, compared with presidential voters, are less well informed about issues and candidates. Compared to congressional elections, presidential elections have been considered as high stimulus elections that are heavily affected by various short-term forces and that provide information about the political campaign (Campbell, 1966).

In low stimulus elections, however, voters would be satisfied with their party's candidate, more or less resting assured that their preferred party's candidate would support the party line. The less political information available, the greater the tendency to rely on the shortcut guideline of partisanship(Shively, 1979). Therefore, it is natural to expect that partisans' electoral decisions such as turnout and vote choice are more responsive to their evaluations of two political parties in congressional elections, especially in the context of low stimulus midterm elections, than in presidential elections.

More specifically, however, compared to positive evaluations of one's own party, negative evaluations of the opposition party may have a stronger impact on the partisan' electoral decisions in midterm congressional elections. The studies on negative effects in political behavior report that the negative evaluations of political objects often have stronger effects on electoral behavior than the positive evaluations. The American Voter(1960) suggests that variations in electoral outcomes from year to year can be best explained by "a negative response of the electorate to the record of the party in power"(p.554). Considering negative effects in political behavior, Lau(1985) argues that negativity in congressional elections is based on perceptual processes, in which negative information, compared to positive information, is more perceptually salient, draws more attention, and therefore is more readily processed(see Reyes, Thompson, and Bower, 1980 : Smith and Miller, 1979). Several studies find that positive sentiment is less potent in attracting votes than is an equal intensity of negative sentiment in driving votes to the opposition in midterm congressional elections(Kernell, 1977 : Lau, 1982, 1985 : Cover, 1986).

Relating the above argument(that negative information is more heavily weighted than positive information) to the previous discussion(that people rely more on their evaluations of the two political parties in low stimulus elections than in high stimulus elections), we can re-state the second hypothesis as follows : Independent of evaluations of one's own party, negative evaluations of the opposition party(which are formed by less frequent [negative] information of the opposition party) may have even stronger effects in the context of low stimulus midterm congressional elections than in the context of high stimulus presidential elections.

The form of the models for testing the hypotheses is as follows :

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

where, Y denotes the dependent variable (e.g., turnout, and vote choice), X_1 denotes positive evaluations of one's own party, X_2 denotes negative evaluations of the opposition party and X_3 denotes partisan strength.

III. Methods and Measures

A cumulative data set was utilized, which consists of variables derived from a series of biennial SRC/CPS National Election Studies, 1978–1988 conducted by the University of Michigan. The data set incorporates data for the same question from several different NES surveys.

Partisan groups are sorted based on the measure of the traditional seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Independent “leaners” are included among partisan groups, depending upon the direction of their preferences. However, pure independents are eliminated from the analysis of partisan evaluation, since the notion of an “opposition” party is not applicable to them.

In congressional elections it may be that only one candidate will appear on the ballot or the candidates may not be affiliated with the major political parties. Thus, there may be an unopposed major party candidate, a major party versus a minor party candidate, and so forth. In such cases, partisans' evaluations of the two political parties are not applicable since the evaluations of one of the two political parties will have no effect on vote decisions. Hence, only contested races having both Democratic and Republican candidates are considered in the analyses.

As a measure of partisans' positive and negative evaluations of political parties, I employed the open-ended question asking what respondents like or dislike about each of the political parties. Up to five positive and five negative responses were recorded. Rather than simple counts of positive and negative information, the net difference of positive minus negative information about one's own party may be a better indicator of positive evaluations of one's own party. Similarly, the net difference of negative minus positive

information about the opposition party is a better indicator of negative evaluations of the opposition party. Hence two new variables were created to represent an excess of positive over negative(for one's own party) and an excess of negative over positive(for the opposition party). The positive evaluations of one's own party were created by subtracting the number of negative reasons from the the number of positive reasons. This new variable ran from 5(five reasons for liking one's own party and none for disliking it) to -5(five negative and zero positive reasons given for one's own party). The negative evaluations of the opposition party were created by subtracting the number of positive reasons from the number of negative reasons. This new variable also ran from 5 to -5.

In addition, strength of PID is incorporated into the models by a dummy variable, i.e., strong partisan vs. leaning and weak partisans. A preliminary examination shows that there is no difference between weak and independent partisans. Thus, learners and weak partisans are lumped together in this study.

The dependent variable in the turnout model is whether a partisan voted or not. It equals one if a partisan claims to have voted, and it equals zero if he claims not to have voted in the recently held congressional election. Another dependent variable is the vote choice, whether a partisan's vote is consistent with his partisan attachment(PID) or not. It equals one if the vote of a partisan is consistent with his party orientation, and it equals zero otherwise.

The logistic regression method was used in the analyses on partisan's electoral behavior because the dependent variables(such as turnout and vote choice) are discrete. This method is a nonlinear estimation technique that is appropriate for the models in which the dependent variables is dichotomous, taking a 1 or 0 value. The logit model uses the cumulative logistic function, in which the probability lies between 0 and 1 and it varies nonlinearly with independent variables.

IV. Empirical Analysis

1. An Overview of Turnout Model

There is general consensus that in the absence of a strong ideology, most people rely

on partisanship to orient their political views and behavior. Most Americans think of themselves as either Republicans or Democrats. One attempt to explain differences in voter turnout focuses on costs and benefits of voting : instrumental(tangible) or expressive(intangible) benefits are weighted against, among others, the costs of time, lost opportunities, and lost income. In this process, political resources(e.g., time, money, social status, information, and experience with politics) help citizens bear the costs of voting.

In this view, partisanship certainly contributes to electoral participation. From an attachment perspective, *The American Voter*(1960) argued that strong feelings of partisan identification contribute to psychological involvement in politics. From an assessment perspective, which views PID as a weighted average of past evaluations of the parties, we would also expect partisanship to contribute to electoral participation since partisan loyalties reduce information costs and thereby reduce the costs of voting(Fiorina, 1981). Furthermore, strong partisans are more likely than other partisans to have stronger preferences for their parties and thus to gain a greater differential benefit from the election of their preferred party(Abramson and Aldrich, 1982).

However, we should note that this differential benefit might also depend on how a partisan evaluates the opposition party. In other words, the partisan impact on turnout appears to be clearer when we consider how partisans evaluate their own party and at the same time how they evaluate the opposition party.

In short, given the importance of partisanship on voter turnout, the model specifies its impact on turnout with respect to(positive) evaluations of one's own party and(negative) evaluations of the opposition party. In addition, a strength of partisan attachment is included in the model.

The form of congressional election model is as follows :

$$\text{Pr} = E(T=1 | X_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon \quad \text{——— Model 1}$$

where $T = 1$ if the respondent voted for a congressional candidate and 0 otherwise :

$$\text{Pr} = E(T = 1 | X_i) = 1/(1+e^{-\beta X_i}) :$$

X_1 : relative positive evaluations of one's own party(appears in the table as Pos) :

X_2 : relative negative evaluations of the opposition party(appears in the table as Neg) :

$X_3=1$ if the respondent is a strong partisan, otherwise 0 (appears in the table as Stpid) :
 α, ϵ = intercept and disturbance terms respectively : and
 $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$ = relevant coefficients on the independent variables.

2. Results

1) Turnout in presidential year congressional elections

The results in 1A-1 support the hypothesis that partisans' separate reactions to the two political parties have a significant influence on determining their turnout in the presidential year congressional elections. That is, the probability of turnout increases as a partisan positively evaluates his own party and negatively evaluates the opposition party.

<Table 1A-1> Turnout in Presidential Year Congressional Elections

| Variable | Beta | Standard Error |
|-----------|--------|----------------|
| Intercept | .3687* | .0462 |
| X (Pos) | .0853* | .0274 |
| X (Neg) | .1029* | .0265 |
| X (Stpid) | .6378* | .0832 |

(N=3667)

* : denotes statistically significant at the .05 level

<Table 1A-1> shows that both Pos and Neg are statistically significant at a probability level of 0.05 and that positive evaluations of one's own party have almost the same influence on turnout as negative evaluations of the opposition party. Also, there is a significant difference between strong partisans and other partisans.

It should be noted that the marginal change of an independent variable (i.e., the impact due to a unit increase of an independent variable) is different across the observations.¹⁾

1) The marginal change gets bigger when the probability converges(0.5) and it gets smaller when the probability is close to one of the limits(0,1). The marginal change of $X_{i,j}$ is $\beta_{i,j} * Pr * (1-Pr)$ where the level of Pr will depend upon the values of all independent variables in the model.

To aid in understanding the logistic estimates in <Table 1A-1>, <Table 1A-2> reports the probability of turnout and marginal change of independent variables depending upon partisan strength.

<Table 1A-2> Probability and Marginal Change for Turnout in
Presidential Year Congressional Elections

| | Strength of PID | |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | Strong (1) | Others (2) |
| Pos | 1.016(m) | (m) |
| Neg | .737(m) | (m) |
| Stpid | 1 | 0 |
| T | 1.169 | .532 |
| Pr (T) | .763 | .630 |
| Margianl Change | | |
| Pos | .015 | .020 |
| Neg | .019 | .024 |

note : (m) denotes the mean value of a variable

The positive mean values of Pos and Neg in <Table 1A-2> indicate that partisans tend to positively evaluate their own party and that they tend to negatively evaluate the opposition party. Although the coefficient of Neg is slightly larger than the coefficient of Pos in the model, <Table 1A-2> shows that the marginal changes of Neg and Pos at the mean values of Neg and Pos are almost the same, producing about 2 percent increases in the probability of turnout (see the 1st and the 2nd columns). In addition, there is about 13 percent difference in the probability of turnout between strong partisans and other partisans, other things being equal (compare the 1st and the 2nd columns).

2) Turnout in midterm congressional elections

Compared to the results of presidential year congressional elections, the important dif-

ference in the results of midterm congressional elections is the insignificant effect of positive evaluations of one's own party on turnout.

〈Table 1B-1〉 Turnout in Midterm Congressional Elections

| Variable | Beta | Standard Error |
|------------------------|---------|----------------|
| Intercept | -.1236* | .0460 |
| X ₁ (Pos) | .0022 | .0301 |
| X ₂ (Neg) | .1408* | .0296 |
| X ₃ (Stpid) | .7636* | .0863 |

(N=3182)

* : denotes statistically significant at the .05 level

In 〈Table 1B-1〉, the results of midterm congressional elections show that the coefficient of Pos is quite small and even that does not meet usual standards of statistical significance(the coefficient of Pos is not significant even at a probability level of 0.1). In contrast, negative evaluations of the opposition party(Neg) have significant effects on turnout at a probability level of .05, and the size of its coefficient is relatively large(.115).

Although these results show that positive evaluations of one's own party have no significant effects on turnout, they support the second hypothesis that negativity in party evaluations has strong effects in the context of midterm congressional elections. As I discussed before, voters may rely on party evaluations in low information elections more than in high information elections. Considering the prevalence of negativity effects on attitudes and behavior, it is not surprising that negative evaluations of the opposition party have strong effects on turnout when people have a greater tendency to rely on party evaluations.

〈Table 1B-2〉 provides an easy interpretation for the logistic estimates in 〈Table 1B-1〉. Based on the mean values of Pos and Neg, 〈Table 1B-2〉 reports the probability of turnout and their marginal changes depending upon partisan strength.

(Table 1B-2) Probability and Marginal Change for Turnout in
Midterm Congressional Elections

| | Strength of PID | |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | Strong (1) | Others (2) |
| Pos | .734(m) | (m) |
| Neg | .687(m) | (m) |
| Stpid | 1 | 0 |
| T | .737 | -.027 |
| Pr (T) | .676 | .493 |
| Margianl Change | | |
| Neg | .031 | .035 |

note : (m) denotes the mean value of a variable

Considering the mean values of Pos and Neg, (Table 1B-2) reports that the probability of turnout in the case of strong partisans(Stpid=1) is .676, while the probability of turnout in the case of weak partisans(Stpid=0) is .493(see the 1st column in (Table 1B-2) for the former and the 2nd column for the latter). In other words, strong partisans are more likely to turn out by 18.3 percent than weak or independent partisans in midterm elections. (By Comparison, the difference in presidential year congressional elections was 13 percent.)

In sum, these results indicate that separate reaction to the two political parties(i.e., evaluations of one's own party and of opposition party) is quite important to understand partisans' turnout. In presidential year elections, negative evaluations of the opposition party have an impact on turnout, comparable to positive evaluations of one's own party. The importance of negativity in evaluating the opposition party is more noteworthy in the context of the midterm congressional elections. In low information elections, the results show that partisans' turnout depends heavily on their evaluations of the opposition party. The more negatively they evaluate the opposition party, the more likely they are to turn out. The more positively they evaluate the opposition party, the more likely

they are to abstain. In contrast, the evaluations of one's own party do not have significant effects on turnout in midterm elections. These midterm findings show that a negativity bias²⁾ influences partisans in their evaluations of political parties, which in turn affects partisans' turnout.

In addition, these results verify that partisan strength contributes to explanation of partisan turnout. Strong partisans turn out at a higher rate than other partisans. The difference in probability of turnout between strong partisans and other partisans is larger in midterm elections than in presidential year congressional elections. As a preliminary examination showed, however, there is no significant difference between weak partisans and independent partisan. This indicates that the distance between strong partisans and weak partisans is not the same as the distance between weak partisan and independent partisans. Therefore, partisan strength is not monotonically related to turnout.

3. An Overview of Vote Choice Model

Students of political behavior have long been interested in what determines the vote. There is an increasing body of empirical studies that nearly always finds the important role of partisanship in voting behavior. Although research attention to partisans has been particularly strong and PID is incorporated as a major ingredient of most voting models, its contribution to the explanation of voting behavior has been questioned. As Weisberg(1982) pointed out, the traditional party identification scale measures many different factors, and thus it is difficult to know what it measures. Therefore, as an explanatory variable PID has some difficulty in providing a substantive answer to individual votes, including partisan defection. An examination of the NES data shows that about 23 percent of partisans defected in their congressional vote from 1976 to 1988.

As much as we emphasize the importance of partisanship, we need to know what partisanship implies and what determines partisans' vote. The situation would be clearer by using a voting model which focuses only on partisans, rather than one which includes in-

2) It refers to "the greater weight given to negative information relative to equally extreme and equally likely positive information(Lau, 1985)."

dependents.

Assuming that the major impact of partisanship on partisans' vote is the product of partisans' overall evaluations of two political parties, the model I propose incorporates partisans' positive evaluations of their own party and their negative evaluations of the opposition party. In addition, a strength of partisan attachment (PID) variable is included in the model.

The form of congressional election model is as follows :

$$\text{Pr} = E(V=1 | X_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon \quad \text{--- Model 2}$$

where $V = 1$ if the respondent's vote is consistent with his party identification and 0 if not consistent :

$$\text{Pr} = E(V=1 | X_i) = 1/(1+e^{-BX_i}) :$$

4. Results

1) Vote choice in presidential year congressional elections

The results in <Table 2A-1> also support the hypothesis that evaluations of one's own party and of the opposition party have significant influences on the congressional vote choice.

<Table 2A-1> Vote Choice in Presidential Year Congressional Elections

| Variable | Beta | Standard Error |
|---------------|--------|----------------|
| Intercept | .6558* | .0621 |
| X_1 (Pos) | .1568* | .0363 |
| X_2 (Neg) | .1898* | .0350 |
| X_3 (Stpid) | .6446* | .1110 |

(N=2460)

* : denotes statistically significant at the .05 level

<Table 2A-1> shows that Pos and Neg are statistically significant at a probability level of 0.05. The positive coefficients of Pos and Neg indicate that the more positively

respondents evaluate their own party and the more negatively they evaluate the opposition party, the more likely they are to vote for their party candidate. Similar to the turnout results, however, negative evaluations of the opposition party have a slightly larger effect on the vote choice for congressional candidate than do positive evaluations of one's own party. Also, strong partisans are more likely to vote for their party candidate than are weaker partisans.

〈Table 2A-2〉 Probability and Marginal Change for Vote Choice in
Presidential Year Congressional Elections

| | Strength of PID | |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | Strong (1) | Others (2) |
| Pos | 1.130(m) | (m) |
| Neg | .848(m) | (m) |
| Stpid | 1 | 0 |
| V | 1.639 | .994 |
| Pr (V) | .838 | .730 |
| Margianl Change | | |
| Pos | .021 | .031 |
| Neg | .026 | .037 |

note : (m) denotes the mean value of a variable

〈Table 2A-2〉 shows the probability and the marginal changes of Pos and Neg. In the case of a strong partisan, the probability of voting for the same party's candidate is about 84 percent and the marginal chagne of Pos is almost the same as the marginal change of Neg(about 2 percent). In the case of weak or independent partisans, the probability is about 73 percent and the marginal change of Pos is about 3 percent, while the marginal change of Neg is about 4 percent.

2) Vote choice in midterm congressional elections

In contrast to presidential year vote choice but like the turnout results for midterm

elections, evaluations of one's own party do not have significant effects on the congressional vote in midterm elections.

(Table 2B-1) Vote Choice in Midterm Congressional Elections
(1978, 1982, 1986)

| Variable | Beta | Standard Error |
|------------------------|---------|----------------|
| Intercept | .8915* | .0729 |
| X ₁ (Pos) | .0517 | .0476 |
| X ₂ (Neg) | .1426* | .0470 |
| X ₃ (Stpid) | 1.0047* | .1509 |

(N=1738)

* : denotes statistically significant at the .05 level

In (table 2B-1), the midterm congressional election model indicates that the coefficient of Pos is quite small and that it is not significant at probability level of 0.1. In contrast, the coefficient of Neg is statistically significant at the 0.5 level, and its size is relatively large(.143). Thus, we can say that (negative) evaluations of the opposition party are the major force to determine partisans's vote in midterm congressional elections.

These findings support the second hypothesis that negative evaluations of the opposition party, compared to positive evaluations of one's own party, would have stronger effects on the congressional vote in midterm elections. As was the case for the midterm turnout model, a strong negativity effect in evaluating political parties(especially the opposition party) might lead partisans to be more responsive to those negative evaluations (of the opposition party) in choosing a congressional candidate. This would be more likely to happen when there is a greater tendency to rely on party evaluations, for example in low information elections. In addition, partisan strength certainly plays a significant role in predicting partisans' voting behavior.

(Table 2B-2) show the probability of vote choice and the marginal changes of Pos and Neg.

(Table 2B-2) Probability and Marginal Change for Vote Choice
in Midterm Congressional Elections

| | Strength of PID | |
|------------------------|-----------------|------------|
| | Strong (1) | Others (2) |
| Pos | .827(m) | (m) |
| Neg | .830(m) | (m) |
| Stpid | 1 | 0 |
| V | 2.057 | 1.053 |
| Pr (V) | .867 | .741 |
| Margianl Change | | |
| Neg | .014 | .027 |

note : (m) denotes the mean value of a variable

With the mean value of Pos and Neg, the probability of vote choice in the case of strong partisans is .887, while in the other case the probability is .741. In other words, strong partisans are more likely to vote for their party's candidate by 14.6 percent than weak or independent partisans in midterm elections. (By comparison, the difference in presidential year congressional elections was 10.8 percent.)

In sum, these results of vote choice examined in this section also reinforce the importance of analyzing respondents' separate reactions to the two political parties in determining partisans' vote. In presidential year elections, partisans' negative evaluations of the opposition party have a comparable effects to their positive evaluations of their own party, affecting congressional votes. In midterm congressional elections, however, negative evaluations of the opposition party have much stronger effects on vote choice than do positive evaluations of one's own party.

As with the turnout results in midterm elections, these results indicate that partisans' vote choice depends heavily on their evaluations of the opposition party. In other word, the more negatively they evaluate the opposition party, the more likely they are to vote for their own party's candidate. Or, the more positively they evaluate the opposition

party, the more likely they are to defect to vote for the opposition party's candidate. This electoral importance of partisans' evaluations of the opposition party in midterm congressional elections, with no added significant impact of evaluations of their own party, implies that evaluations of the opposition party increase the importance of electoral decision in the eyes of the voter : thus, it makes sense that the probability of turnout in midterm elections appeared to be responsive to those evaluations as shown in the previous section. These findings – that in midterm elections, only negative evaluations of the opposition party have significant effects on turnout and vote choice – confirm the strength of negative information which comes to be reflected in negative evaluations of parties. This in turn affects partisans' vote choice as well as their turnout.

Concerning partisan strength, in addition, we find that there is a significant difference between strong partisans and other partisans in choosing a candidate. The difference is larger in midterm congressional elections, compared to presidential year elections.

V. Conclusion

The main purpose of this study is to provide some explanations for the partisan effect in electoral behavior. Partisans' voting behavior is viewed as a set of separate reactions to the major American political parties. Thus, the partisan effect was analyzed by positive evaluations of one's own party and, at the same time, negative evaluations of the opposition party. With respect to the fact that the partisans' evaluations of the opposition party have received scant research attention or have been just assumed as the reverse side of evaluations of one's own party, the available evidence suggests that it is not the case. There are distinct roles for evaluations of the opposition party in congressional turnout and vote choice. What is more, evaluations of the opposition party often have a greater influence on partisans' voting behavior than do those of one's own party.

Conceptually, partisan identification embraces negative evaluations of the opposition party as well as positive evaluations of one's own party. This study allows us to give empirical content to this all-inclusive concept of PID introduced by Campbell and his associates. This study also conforms to the literature emphasizing the cognitive side of partisan-

ship, which construes PID as a reflection of people's(positive and negative) evaluations of the past and current performance of the two parties. In addition, this study reinforces the argument of multidimensional conceptualization of political parties as well.

The strong negativity effect in partisans' evaluations of the political parties(i.e., negative evaluations of the opposition party) has some implications for the study of electoral behavior. First, models of the dynamics of change of PID may be better specified by the multiple indicators model. Previous research on partisanship has demonstrated the strong relationship between prior and current partisanship. This study suggests that current partisanship may be influenced by both positive evaluations of one's own party and negative evaluations of the opposition party. Furthermore, the latter may be a stronger force to change one's partisanship than the former. To better determine the effects of these party evaluations, panel data are necessary.

Second, the decline of turnout in America may be better explained by partisans' evaluations of the two political parties. On the one hand, evidence presented in this study has shown that there is a strong effect of negative evaluations of the opposition party on turnout. On the other hand, several recent studies show that there is a notable decline in negative partisanship(i.e., negative attitudes toward the opposition party) (Wattenberg, 1990; Scarrow, 1990). Therefore, it will be interesting to speculate on the relationship between decline of turnout and evaluations of political parties.

Third, the findings in this study suggest some advice for strategies for allocating scarce campaign resources. With negative evaluations of the opposition party shown to have a strong effect on partisans' voting behavior, campaign strategies should be directed toward mobilizing partisans who are hostile toward the opposition party. As Maggiotto and Piereson(1977) suggested, less energy is needed to activate and reinforce the same party members, rather than to convert the opposition party members. One might note that this strategy may also result in the rise of straight-ticket voting by mobilizing hostile partisans.

Finally, the strong negativity effect of partisans' attitudes toward the opposition party may provide an insight into the understanding of the regionalism in Korea, especially between Yongnam and Honam provinces. Regionalism was particularly evident in the

results of recently held local elections(1991) as well as presidential elections(1987, 1992) and congressional elections(1988, 1992). These elections were heavily influenced by regional prejudices. Voters overwhelmingly chose a candidate considering his party leader's home territory, with little regard for the ideologies, issue positions, and social backgrounds of the candidates. With regard to negativity effect, it would be interesting to speculate the regionalism in vote choice from the perspectives of positive attitudes toward their own group(province) and negative attitudes toward the opposition group (province). In recent studies of anti-candidate voting, Sigelman and Gant(1985, 1989) argue that candidate choice can be a matter of repulsion as well as attraction. In a similar vein, the regionalism in vote choice may also be a matter of repulsion as well as attraction. In other words, voters have decided on a candidate not because they like him but because they dislike the others. Or, voters support a political party not because they like it but because they dislike the other political parties³⁾.

Of course, this study has some limitations. In part, they may be overcome, however. Although this study focused on American partisanship under its two-party system, this approach can be applied to European partisanship under multi-party system in which the traditional socio-political cleavage parties may induce interparty hostility, this is, feelings of hostility toward opposition party. A recent study suggests that hostile attitudes toward opposition parties may be a common component of European partisanship along with positive attitudes toward preferred party(Richardson, 1991).

Second, this study employed the difference for each party in the number of open-ended likes and dislikes comments for that party. If we consider the content of comments as well, it will help to measure more accurately the intensity of evaluations of political parties. Finally, as an alternative measure of party evaluations, the thermometer question asking attitudes toward political parties can be employed, separately or as a complement to party likes and dislikes questions.

3) Political parties in Korea have been changed frequently so that an individual may find it difficult to develop his partisan attachment toward a political party. However, recent studies on Korean partisanship argue that partisanship in Korea can be conceptualized as in-party partisanship(i.e., attitudes toward the party in power) and out-party partisanship(Lee, N., 1992 : Cho, J., 1992 : Cho, K., 1992).

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