# Development and Space in Korea: Toward a Structural and Historical Understanding of Urban / Regional Development (Part I)\*

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The purpose of this article is to show the possible relationship between the pattern of Korean development and pattern of urban / regional spatial changes in Korea from 1945 to 1985. Specifically, this article relates export promotion industrialization strategy and its concomitant agrarian changes with the ensuing regional disparity and the rapidly growing urbanization in Korea. For this purpose, first, general pattern of Korean urban / regional development will be briefly described, and secondly, explanations for specific type of regional / urban development will be given by referring to the industrial and agrarian policies within the framework of changing international political

<sup>\*</sup> This is the first part of the article. The seconal one is to be presented in the next issue.

economy. Finally, in the conclusion part, some political and economic implications of these spatial changes will be explored.

# I. General pattern of Urban / Regional Development

# 1. Preliminary Discussions in Measurement.

There are several ways of describing spatial changes in a certain country. One of the most widely used method (also the crudest and the simplist one) is to look into the degree of population concentration in a certain area. To say, Korea is urbanized 70% in 1985 belongs to this category of description. This method of measuring urban areas according to the number of people has been widely used in cross—national comparative social research. Although it shows general degree of urbanization, in its strict sense, it is no more than a raw datum to be reanalyzed. As is well known, a study that is basically correlational (in other words, statistical) showed difficulty in establishing causality. This method has a fatal flaw in pursuing contextual (qualitative) knowledge. A simple description of the concentration of people does not show anything about how and why people move or are concentrated in a certain area rather than others. For example, the correlation of economic growth and levels of urbanization was widely used by the modernization theorists during the fifties and sixties but it failed to show the critical dimensions of how and why these two variables are interrelated with each other.

Another mehtod is to use urban primacy and the rank—size distribution of the urban system. The most common definition of urban primacy is to use the Ginsberg index (or David index), which is the proportion of the population in the four top cities compared with the largest one. During the sixties and seventies, contrary to the predictions by the modernization theorists, growing urbanization in peripheral societies became increasingly correlated not with economic development but with widening income disparities and highly skewed urbanization in favor of one or two big cities at the cost of regional urban center. The phenomena of so—called "over—urbanization," or "hyper—urbanization" meant the urbanization exceeding the degree of economic growth. And commonly "overurbanization" implied the overconcentration of people in one or two big cities at the cost of balanced rank—size distribution of cities.

In this context, it was natural that the focus on urban primacy has been influenced by the world-system theory "especially in its earlier guise as dependency theory" (C. Smith, 1985, 87).

As she puts it, "theories of both economec dependency and urban primacy grow up with the Latin American experience in mind" (C, Smith, 1985, 83), From the earlier work by Frank (1968) to the more contemporary argument by Kentor (1981), urban primacy in Latin America is considered to be the outcome of structural determinents of peripheral urbanization. According to Kentor (1981), international economic dependence in periphery stimulates growth in the tertiary and informal sectors, while inhibiting growth in the industrial labor sector. And this restructuring of the urban labor force is said to generate increased level of overurbanization in peripheral countries.

However, radical explanations of urban primacy in the periphery fail to consider the diversified urban / regional development patterns in peripheral societies. Thus far, what is clear is that rank size distribution of cities can be found more easily in core areas and primacy in peripheral areas, but the causalities of primacy and rank-size distribution are still indeterminate. In other words, primate cities are one of the most distinctive features of peripheral urbanization but this phenomenon is not necessarily limited to peripheral societies. As Carol Smith puts it (1985, 98), we are not still sure whether "primacy is absolutely damaging to economic development, but we are fairly sure that few developed countries have a primate urban system."

From the above discussions, we can safely argue that the general degree of urbanization and primacy have heuristic value in describing and explaining peripheral urbanization. For a more precise and analytic description and an explanation of peripheral urban pattern, however, we are forced to consider two more indicators of urban / regional change, namely, urban structure and ruralurban disparities.

The rationale behind incorporating these new indicators is that urbanization in peripheral societies is basically a phenomenon of rural-exdous and urban primacy does not show us the dynamics of middle—range cities ranked below in calculating urban primacy. As Roberts correctly puts it (19 78), cities in peripheral countries are "cities of peasants." Without considering rural development, a mere description of population concentration in urban areas loses much of its meaning. For a proper understanding of spatial change in peripheral societies answer to the questions of "why people has to move?" and "how people move?" from rural to urban areas must be given first.

To sum up, in describing Korean urban / regional spatial change we will employ four indicators, namely, degree of urbanization, urban primacy, urban structure, and rural-urban imbalance, respectively.

#### 2. Degree of urbanization

During the past three decades Korea has experienced an unprecedently high urban growth. Table

1 shows Korea's total population and the urban percentage for census years from 1920–1980 with comparable data for United States and Mexico. What is self evident from this data is that Korea has experienced rapid urbanization within a relatively short time. What took 50 years for Mexico (31.2% in 1920 and 58.9% in 1970) was accomplished just in 20years in Korea (28.3% in 1960 and 57% in 1980).

Even among peripheral societies, where degree of urbanization has been more rapid than core countries since the Second World War, speed of Korean urbanization can be regarded as very high.

Table 1. Total and Urban Population of Korea, U.S. and Mexico 1920-1980. (1,000s)

	Korea <del>X</del>		U.S.		Mexico	
****	Total		Total		Total	
year	Population Un	ban%**	Population Urban%**		Population Urban%**	
1920	17,289	3.3	106,000	51.	14,334	31.2
1930	20,438	4.5	122,800	56.2	16,541	33.5
1940	23,547	11.6	131,700	56.5	19.653	35.1
1950	20,167	18.4	150,700	59.6	25,790	42.6
1960	24,954	28.3	178,500	63.5	36.046	54
1970	31,435	43.1	203,200	73.5	50,313	58.9
1980	37,436	57.0	226,505	73.7	69,965	66.4

Note: \*The Korean from 1920 to 1940 include North Korea and data from, 1950 to 1985 are only for South Korea.

Source: Mills and Song(1979), p.8 Table 1
Kim and Mills(1988), p.396 Table 1
Pozo-Ledezma(1986), p.539 Table 20-1
ILO Statistical Yearbook (1980, 1970, 1960)

Table 2. Urban Population Growth in Core and Periphery (1950 & 1975)

	year			
Area	1950	1975		
All Peciphery	16.5	28.3		
All Core	51.6	66.9		
World Average	28.2	38.9		
Korea	18.4	50.9		

Source: Mills and Song (1979), P.9, Table 2.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Calculation of urban areas are based on the official definition of urban area in each country,

As shown in table 2, within less than three decades Korean urbanization has been tripled, while the average of all peripheral societies is less than double.

Also from Table 1 we can broadly identify three historical turning points in Korean urbanization. The first turning point came around 1930, while the second and third, in 1950 and 1960, respectively. The historical background of the first turning point can be found in the changes in Japanese colonial policy. When Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910, Japanese colonial policy emphasized raw material and agricultural extraction (in this case, rice) from Korea as many European imperial powers did in South East Asia. But with the invasion of Manchuria in 1930 and also as a repercussion of a down-turn of agricultural prices in the island, Japan shifted its colonial policy from agricultural exploitation to industrial exploitation. During this period, pauperization of peasants and concentration of industrial laborers in urban areas remarkably increased the level of urbanization. In this way, Japan could use the Korean peninsular as a stepping stone for invading Manchuria and at the same time as a safety-valve of its own domestic socio-political problems.

The second turning point came around the Korean War(1950-1953). With the coming of liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, many Koreans returned from forced exiles in China and forced migration (to be used as a cheap labor) in Japan. Also the Korean War produced a large number of war refugees who mostly moved from the North to the South, Most of them settled down in urban areas to find jobs,

The third turning point came with rapid industrialization after 1960. A dramatic increase of urbanization from 28% in 1960 to 65% in 1985 within a quarter of a century is, by any standard, remarkably high. Two sources of rapid urbanization are discernable, each of which represents a massive degree of rural-to-urban exodus of people and the rapid industrialization in a few urban areas, During this period, major agricultural regions (Cholla, Chungchong, and Kyungsang provinces) lost population to the two big urban centers of Seoul and Pusan, where labor-intensive industrializ ation began from the sixties.

# 3. Urban Primacy

In Korea, in almost all areas of activity, the capital city Seoul has played a predominant role at least since the 14th century when the Yi dynasty located its capital in Seoul in 1392. Under the Japanese colonial rule(1910-1945), Seoul never lost its importanec. But it was not until the Korean War(or more exactly until the begining of the sixties) that Seoul gained such a massive population influx and socio-political and economec dominance.

Although some scholars argue that Seoul is too large and too dominant in many respects, others

argue that the current problem of urban primacy is not as serious as it might appear (Mills and Song, 1979; Kim and Mills, 1988). From a comparative point of view, urban primacy in Seoul is not as serious as in other peripheral societies and the degree of primacy is declining, they argue. The rather successful story of urban "growth poles" in some provincial areas is also pointed out (Anje Kin, 1978). But a careful analysis reveals that these optimistic diagnosis of urban primacy in Korea need to be corrected in some ways. First, in case of demographic concentration, if we introduce the idea of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area(SMSA), actual demographic primacy in Korea has been increased. Second, non—demographic indices (social, cultural, and economic indices) shows not decreasing but increasing urban primacy. Finally, simple and unidimensional analysis based on demographic features of urban primacy in Korea conceals more important qualitative changes of the capital city of Seoul.

### (1) Demographic Urban Primacy

Table 3 shows some statistical dimensions of urban primacy in Korea. The degree of urban

Table 3. Demographic Urban Primacy in Korea(1960-1985)

(populations in thousands)

year / city(rank)		Seoul(1)	Pusan(2)	Taegue(3)	Inchon(4)	Total	Primacy#	
1000	Pop.	2,445	1,163	676	402	4,868	1.00	
1960	(%)	(9.8)	(4.7)	(2.7)	(1.6)	(18.8)	1.09	
1000	Pop.	3,805	1,430	847	529	6,616	1.00	
1966	(%)	(13)	(4.9)	(2.9)	(1.8)	(22.6)	1.36	
1075	Pop.	6,889	2,454	1,311	800	11,474	1.5	
1975	(%)	(19.9)	(7.1)	(3.8)	(2.3)	(33)	1.5	
1075	Pop.	7,514 <del>×</del>	2,454	1,311	800	12,099	1.04	
1975	(%)	(21.7)	(7.1)	(3.8)	(2.3)	(34.9)	1.64	
1005	Pop.	9,639	3,515	2,030	1,387	16,571	1.00	
1985	(%)	(24)	(8.7)	(5)	(3.4)	(41)	1.39	
1005	Pop.	11,449 <del>×</del> ·×	3,515	2,030	1,387	18,380	1.05	
1985	(%)	(28.3)	(8.7)	(5)	(3.4)	(45.4)	1.65	

Notes: \*includes population of satellites of Seoul (Sungnam, Eujjongbu, Anyang, Bucheon)

#Calculation of primacy based on David's Index(P1 / P2+P3+P4)

Sources: Data for 1960, 1966, 1975 are obtained from Mills and Song(1979), p,49

Data for 1975' are obtained from Korea Statistical Yearbook, EPB(1980)

Data for 1985, 1985' are obtained from Population and Housing Census, EPB(1985)

<sup>\*\*</sup>includes population of satellites of Seoul(Sungnam, Euijongbu, Anyang, Bucheon, Kwang-myung, Kwacheon)

primacy calculated according to the David Index (P=P<sub>1</sub>/P<sub>2</sub>+P<sub>3</sub>+P<sub>4</sub>, where P means urban primacy, while P2, P3, P4 are populations of second, third, and fourth largest cities respectively) shows an increasing primacy of Seoul up to 1975 but declining primacy afterwards. The David's index moved from 1.09 in 1960 to 1.36, 1.5, 1.3 in 1966, 1975 and 1985 respectively.

At a firat glance, these data seem to be testimony to what modernization theorists argue with regard to urban development patterns. According to them, during the early development stages (so-called take-off period), population, investment and other economic resources are supposed to be concentrated on large cities (especially primate city). But these phenomena are supposed to be diluted toward a more balanced urban system with further economic growth, thereby decreasing the rate of urban primacy. That is, the "polarized development" (Meyer and Min, 1987, 599) of early economic growth is supposed to be transformed into multi-polar or balanced urban development pattern. Generally, the period from 1960 to the early 1970s is regarded as the take-off stage of Korean economic "miracle," while from that on Korea began to enter the mature economic growth stage through the deepening of industrialization.

But closer analysis shows the possibility of another interpretation. While in the United States 5 0.000 residents in the central city is the requirement for a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), a city is a local government jurisdiction of more than 50,000 residents in Korea, (Mills and Song, 1979, 6)

In other words, in calculating the number of residents of the metropolitan area, the surrounding urbanized counties or suburbs are not included in Korea. In this case, surrounding urbanized areas include the areas that fall into the orbit of central city in terms of job market, commutability, and in other economically related activities.

If we introduce the idea of a SMSA to the case of Seoul, many small satellite cities of Seoul are nothing but an extension of the capital city limit. Even the fourth largest city, Inchon(which is not included in calculating urban primacy based on SMSA) is only 25 miles from Seoul. Also the adjacent Gyeonggi provincial capital of Suwon (not included in calculating primacy based on SMSA) is within commutable distance and is connected to Seoul by subway. If we recalculate urban primacy including the several satellites of Seoul (Sungnam, Euijongbu, Anyang, and Buchon in case of 1975 and Sungnam, Euijongbu, Anyang, Buchon, Kwangmyung, and Kwachon in 1985 )the urban primacy ratio jumps from 1.5 to 1.64 in 1975 and from 1.39 to 1.65 in 1985. If we include Suwon and Inchon, the ratio becomes much higher.

Although it is still true that primacy in Korea is much lower than in most peripheral societies, unlike the predictions of modernization theorists, Korea is not experiencing decreasing primacy. Also, unlike the predictions of dependency theorists, its primacy is not increasing rapidly with economic growth.

#### (2) Eeonomic Primacy

loan

63.2

Without any doubt, Seoul has been the center of economic activities all throughout the twentieth century. But it is not until the acceleration of economic growth after the 1960s that the concentration of wealth and economic activities in Seoul became overwhelming.

One of the best indicators that reveal the concentration of wealth in capital city is to look into the flow of financial assets. In Korea, during the last three decades, government acted to increase internal capital accumulation. The state of Korea has a strong inclination towards nationalistic self—independence. To minimize the impact of foreign dependency in supporting rapid economic growth, the Korean state has refused direct foreign investment as much as it could, and has instead relied on borrowing from foreign banks. In this process, Korean state continuously urged people to increase their savings by artificially increasing interest rates on bank deposits. By contrast, loans to individuals were tightly controlled for the purpose of capital accumulation and economic growth. Most foreign and domestic loans were distributed to a few conglomerates(called Chaebol equivalent to Zeibatsu in Japan) on a very low interest rates to facilitate the exports of goods to foreign markets.

Table 4 shows the dominance in importance of Seoul in financial markets in Korea, When we compare the financial primacy with demographic primacy (Table3), the degree of financial resources concentration is easily discernable. During the last three decades, population primacy reached its peak at the point of 1.5(in this case, excluding satellites of Seoul), while financial primacy reached 4.45. From 1966 to 1985 more than 60% of the total national deposits were made in Seoul while

year / cit	у	Seoul(1)	Pusan(2)	Daegu(3)	Inchon(4)	Total	1/2+3+4
	deposit	57	8.2	4.8	2.3	72.3	3.78
1961	loan	35.4	7	7	1.4	50.7	2.48
1000	deposit	64	9.5	5.2	2	69.2	3.27
1966	loan	53	8.6	6.3	1.3	69.2	3.27
1075	deposit	65.3	10.2	4.2	1.7	81.4	4.06
1975	loan	66.5	9.1	4.6	1.2	81.4	4.46
1001	deposit	64	9.4	4.3	2.1	79.8	4.05
1961	loan	64	9	4	1.8	78.8	4.32
4004	deposit	61.6	8.8	4.2	2.6	77.2	3.95
1961	1	20.0		4.4	0.0	77.4	4.45

4.1

2.3

77.4

4.45

Table 4. Financial Primacy in Korea 1961-1985 (as a percentage to whole nation)

Source: calcualted from Korea Statistical Yearbook, EPB(1969, 1971, 1975, 1980, 1986)

7.8

around 60% of loans were made also in Seoul. Concentration of financial activities in Seoul has been, on the average, three times higher than the population concentration.

## (3) Changing Nature of Urban Primacy

The aforementioned quantitative dimensions of urban primacy (increasing demographic and economic concentration), however, should not conceal the equally important changes in qualitative dimension. Data from Table 5 show that the number of manufacturing workers in Seoul directly related to the production process has been declining since 1975. According to these data, the significance of manufacturing activity (in terms of ratio of Economically Active Population assigned to manufacturing activities) in Korean economy is increasing sharply.

Within two decades, the percentage of people employed in manufacturing doubled from 11% of the economically active population (EAP) in 1967 to 22.5% in 1985. But in the case of Seoul, begining with the seventies, the portion of workers directly related to manufacturing activities (e.g., those who do not have positions in administration and control function of manufacturing) has been declining. Total number of people who have jobs in manufacturing activities has increased in absolute and relative terms while Seoul has kept losing its significance in this area. It can thus be concluded that a transfer of manufacturing facilities and activities to the other parts of the country has occurred. And this is exactly what has happened in Korea with the growth of the industrial complex in southeastern part of the peninsular and the satellite cities around Seoul since the begining of 1970s.

% of workers total number of X X total number of persons X in Seoul Workers in manufacturing year (% to EAP) (% to EAP) 648,811(6.8) 31.3 1,043,000(11) 1967 829,044(8.4) 33.4 1,222,000(12.5) 1969 1,420,144(11.5) 30.5 1975 2,205,000(17.9) 2,111,863(15.2) 25.4 3,016,000(21.6) 1978 1985 3,500,000(22.5) 2.215,233(14.2) 21.1

Table 5. Declining Dominance of Manufacturing Activity in Seoul

Notes: EAP means "Economically Active Population,"

Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook, EPB(1970, 1975, 1981, 1985)

<sup>\*</sup>This category includes all the employed persons in manufacturing activities including line workers, managers, administrators etc.

<sup>\*\*</sup>This category includes only on-line production workers.

In turn, what accompanies concentration of wealth and population, and the changing employment structures in the capital city is unbalanced inner—city infra—structural development. With the massive influx of people from the rural areas, Seoul reached its maximum limits in providing adequate infrastructure for the increasing number of Seoul citizens by the middle of the seventies.

Solutions to this macro urban problem were found by urban policy makers through a combination of wealth and income concentration among the upper strata of Seoul citizens on the one hand, and the land speculation by city government on the other. Once government designates some areas as sites for urban renewal or for future development (with rosy—colored blue prints providing adequate infrastructure), uninvested large chunks of concentrated wealth (from the underground financial market) pour into this area in pursuit of easy money, thereby dramatically increasing the land prices. In this process, government garners financial resources for the provision of infrastructure in this area by catching the differences between originally low land prices and the skyrocketed land values.

The loser in this speculative game was the urban poor, Soaring land values made it more difficult for the poor people to enjoy adequate living conditions. This pattern of urban development resulted in an implicit segregation of the poor from the rich, thereby creating the well developed sourhern part of Seoul for the rich and the new—middle class while most of the poor people remained in the northern part of old Seoul. As it happened, with the shift of wealth there were also shifts of social, cultural and educational facilities and activities from the old Seoul to 'new' Seoul.

#### 4. Urban Structure

The urban primacy identified above were anticipated by scholars affiliated with world system perspectives (Armstrong and McGee, 1985). But the other aspects of Korean urbanization were not. What we mean by "the other aspects" of Korean urbanization are the growth and industrializ ation of some regional centers and the remarkable stability in the distribution of city size. In many peripheral societies, increasing primacy has been largely accompanied by the concomitant stagnation or underdevelopment of regional centers. Although this statement does not necessarily imply the total stagnation or underdevelopment of regional centers (Roberts, 1978; C. Smith, 1986), the dynamics of intermediate—sized cities found in Korea entails different theoretical as well as practical significance compared to the other peripheral societies,

The size distribution of Korean cities has shown remarkable stability during the last several decades. As Mills and Song put it succinctly, "almost all Korean cities have grown rapidly, but there is no tendency for Seoul, or any other city, to become increasingly dominant." (1979, 52) Of course,

from our previous discussions on urban primacy we already know that this statement is somewhat exaggerated and misgiuded when we consider the socio-economic dimensional changes of Seoul, If Seoul did not become increasingly dominant, it was not because of balanced urban growth, but because Seoul had already become dominant. But at the same time it is true that almost all Korean cities have grown rapidly and the rank order (based on urban population) of Korea's six largest cities during last four decades (1949-1987) has remained the same(see Table 6).

In Table 6, the periods of most rapid urbanization in Korea are covered from 1960 to 1985. When we think of the low degree of urbanization in 1960(28%) and the strong continuity of urban ranksize in Korean society throughout most of the twentieth century, we can regard the 1960 data as reflecting the traditional Korean urban system untouched by sweeping forces of industrialization. As a consequence, by comparing and contrasting data from each decade we can broadly perceive

	1960		1970		1980		1985	
rank	city	pop.	city	pop,	city	pop.	city	pop.
1	Seoul	2,445	Seoul	5,536	Seoul	8,346	Seoul	9,464
_2	Pusan	1,163	Pusan	1,881	Pusan	3,159	Pusan	3,517
3	Taegu	676	Taegu	1,083	Taegu	1,605	Taegu	2,031
4	Inchon	402	Inchon	646	Inchon	1,084	Inchon	1,387
5	Kwangju	315	Kwangju	503	Kwangju	728	Kwangju	906
6	Taejon	299	Taejon	415	Taejon	652	Taejon	866
7	Chonju	189	Chonju	236	Ulsan	418	Ulsan	551
8	Masan	158	Mokpo	191	Masan	386	Buchon	456
9	Mokpo	130	Masan	178	Sungnam	377	Masan	449
10	Chongju	92	Suwon	159	Chonju	367	Sungnam	447
11	Suwon	91	Ulsan	159	Suwon	310	Suwon	430
12	Kunsan	90	Chongju	144	Anyang	254	Chonju	426
13	Yosu	87	Chunchon	123	Chongju	253	Anyang	362
14	Chinju	87	Chinju	122	Mokpo	222	Chongju	350
15	Chunchon	83	Yosu	114	Buchon	221	Pohang	261
16	Wonju	77	Kunsan	112	Chinju	203	Mokpo	236
17	Kyungiu	76	Wonju	112	Pohang	201	Chinju	227
18	Sunchon	69	Cheju	106	Cheju	168	Kwangmyung	220
19	Chungju	69	Cujongbu	94	Kunsan	165	Cheju	203
20	Cheju	68	Kyungju	92	Yosu	161	Iri	192

Table 6. Urban Poputation and Rank 1960-1985 (in thousands)

Sources: Data for 1960 and 1970 are obtained from Mills and Song(1979), Table 12, p. 49-50. Data for 1980 and 1985 are obtained and modified from Korea Statistical Yearbook, EPB (1986)

the general urban structural changes in Korea during the last quarter of a century.

Table 6 lists the twenty largest Korean cities during the last twenty five years according to rank based upon population. Two groups of city formation can be easily defined. The first group (from first to sixth ranked cities) are comprised of major traditional Korean cities, while the remaining group of cities (from seventh to twentieth ranked cities) can be regarded as intermediate—sized cities.

What is identifiable from these data can be summarized as follows. First, even during the rapid period of industrialization and urbanization, the major cities ranked within sixth place have retained their traditional significance. Second, up to the year of 1970, traditional intermediate—sized cities retained rank status, but with the begininng of the seventies and the acceleration of industrialization we find turbulent changes among intermediate—sizd cities. Third, the rapid growth of satellites of Seoul (Anyang, Buchon, Sungnam, Kwangmyung.) is remarkable. Fourth, cites along the southeastern coastal areas (Ulsan, Pohang, Kumi, Changwon)have grown rapidiy. Fifth, by contrast, cities in agricultural areas (southwestern part of the peninsular: Chonju, Mokpo, Kunsan etc.) have experienced continuous downward stagnation. Finally, urbanization in mountainous regions (Chungbug, Kangwon, and northern parts of Kyungbug) has been stagnant.

Major reason for changes in urban structure during the last three decades can be found in the different degree of manufacturing activities each region. The location of manufacturing activities have been excessively concentrated in two growth pole areas, and this tendency has been aggravated in recent years. While in 1963 two urban industrial centers (Seoul / Kyunggi, Pusan / Kyungnam) comprised 75% of total employment in this sector and 77.3% of total value added, it increased up to the point of 87.2% in case of employment and 83.2% in the case of value added. By contrast, industrial manufacuring activities in the other remaining regions (mostly agricultural regions) declined. (Kong, 1989, 132–133 and see Table 14)

In more detail, theoretical importance of these urban structural changes can be summarized as follows. First, the growth of intermediate—sized did not happen in traditional provincial centers but in little—known small cities. As a consequence, relative importance of traditionally important cities are decreasing compared to these new intermediate—sized urban centers. In its extreme, the most dramatic growth of intermediate—sized cities occurred among "new—born" cities. So, the growth of intermediate—sized cities did not happen in a piecemeal manner but in an abrupt manner in new areas.

Second, the growth of intermdiate—sized is the direct outcome of rapid industrial growth. Some cities developed a more labor—intensive industry while others more capital—intensive one. But all of them are industrial cities focused on manufacturing. This is in sharp contrast to the cases of

medium-sized city growth in Latin America, where the cities are more or less concentrated upon petty commodity production and commercial activities rather than upon industrial manufacturing activities. Compared to its Latin American counterpart, Korean intermediate cities are heavily skewed towards production—related activities.

Third, locations of the growing intermediate - sized cities are strongly concentrated on two growth poles: the Seoul / Kyunggi area and the Pusan / Kyungsang area. Not a single "new" intermediate-sized city grew out of these two regions before 1980. Other regions experienced very slow urban growth and cities in these regions experienced rapid decline in terms of population compared to the two growth pole regions.

#### Urban / Rural Imbalance

The other side of the story of increasing disparities between regions is a story of urban / rural imbalances. Most economically disfavored regions during the rapid economic growth in most cases overlap with agricultural regions. Rapid industrialization brought about a significant decline in the economic position of farming households. And since industrial growth has occurred in the two growth pole areas, it has also led to increased regional disparity. In short, the phenomenon of urban / rural disparity in Korea means disparity between agricultural / non-agricultural regions.

As can be seen from Table 7, the declining rural share of total employment in agriculture, forestry, and fishery has been noticeable for some time. In 1960, 96 % of employment in agriculture could be found in rural areas. This has dropped to 94% in 1975 and 75% in 1985. By contrast, absolute and relative size of rural population employed in manufacturing has increased from 3.5% in 1960 to 15.6% in 1985. The overall picture from these data is the increasing importance of manufacturing and decreasing importance of agriculture and fishing in the national as well as the rural job market. Simply stated, these data show the importance of agriculture as a source of employment and underdevelopment of industrial activity in rural ares. In turn, these data implicitly show the regional concentration of industrial facilities outside rural agricultural areas.

Reflecting upon the declining importance of agriculture, rural areas have experienced a heavy loss of population and the labor power. During the seventies and eighties total population increased 1.7% in average annually while agricultural areas experienced negative annual average increase (-2.8%). Some major agriculturalareas (Cholla province) have experienced even absolute as well as relative decline of population. Even among rapidly urbanizing peripheral societies, absolute decline of rural population is a very uncommon phenomenon. Indirectly, this phenomenon shows the rapid disintegration of Korean rural areas. Also while chances of employment increased annually 3.0%, 3.5

Manufac-

turing

Indus. / year 1960 • 1975 1985 dis't by rural share dis't by rural share dis't by rural share sector of total(%) of total(%) of total(%) sector sector Total rural 5,502 7,553 5,450 employment 100 78 100 59 100 40.9 Agriculture / forestry / 80.9 96 77.5 94 57 75 fishery

Table 7. Employed persons in rural areas by selected industry.

Note: Rural area includes every residential area, populations of which are less than 50,000.

41

Source: 1960 and 1975 data are from Samuel Ho(1982), p.976, table 1, and 1985 data are calculated from Population and Housing Census, EPB(1985)

6.2

21

8.8

15.6

Table 8. Comparison of Real Per Capita Income between Urban Wage Earner's and Farm Household(in won)

	year / family	Farm*(a)	Urban**(b)	a/b
	1965	71,068	73,882	0.96
	1967	80,605	134,332	0.60
	1971	93,745	145,508	0.64
	1973	136,429	163,240	0.84
	1975	155,050	166,858	0.93
	1977	177,542	232,429	0.76
	1981	199,037	310,836	0.64
average	1965~70	6.6%	14.5%	
annual	1970~75	9.6%	2.8%	_
increase	1975~80	4.8%	13.8%	

Note: ★ deflated by Index Number of Farm Products(1970=100)

\*\* deflated by All City Consumer Price Index(1975=100)

Source: Chung(1984), p.62. Table 2

rural agricultural employment decreased 2.9% from 1975 to 1980. A direct outcome of the declining importance of agriculture within overall economic growth in Korea has been an increasing imbalance between urban and rural areas in terms of income and expenditure. Table 8 shows the deteriorating rural economic conditions. According to this data, compared to urban wage earner's real per capita income, that of farm household has been aggravating despite the short term increase during the

early seventies (1971~1975). As will be discussed, short term relative increase of real per capital income in farm household during this period can be explained by the increase in the governmental investment in rural areas under the catch phrase of New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong).

Spatial implication of the increasing urban / rural imbalance can be found in the low degree of urbanization in rural areas. For example, the share of urban population in major agricultural regions (Cholla provinces) to the whole urban population declined from 13.5 in 1960 to 9.2% in 1985. By contrast, the share of the urban population in the two growth poles has increased from 70% in 1960 to 81% in 1985. As we have already discussed, intermediate-sized cities are heavily concentrated around two major growth poles of Pusan and Seoul, and the traditional regional centers in agricultural areas have been stagnant.

At this point, what we should bear in mind is the very fact that we can not equate the phenomena of rural decay with the phenomena of rural de-urbanization or urban stagnation in rural areas. Rather, this relationship is closely connected to the question of rural mode of production, Although we can not generalize the relationship between rural mode of production and its spatial implication. there is a strong tendency that in commercial agricultural areas, chances of urbanization increase while in peasant farming areas, degree of urbanization decrease. For example, in north-western Mexico where commercial agriculture is prevalent, degree of urbanization is much higher compared to central and southern Mexico where peasant farming is prevalent (for more detail, see, Standing, 1981).

The general pattern of urban / regional development in Korea during rapid industrialization and economic growth can be summarized as follows.

- 1) By any standard, the pace of urbanization in Korea has been very rapid. 65% of Korean society became urbanized in 1985, compared with 28% in 1960. For example, what took Mexico 60 years (in 1920 Mexico was 31%; While 66.4% in 1980) has been accomplished within approximately 25 years in Korea. This fact quite naturally implies fundamental social changes in Korea.
- A massive influx of population into the capital city of Seoul accompanied rapid urbanization during the last twenty five years. Contrary to what modernization theorists argue, the primary ratio of Seoul is increasing (if we introduce the SMSA concept), though with some stabilizing forces. In short, the relative weight of Seoul in terms of population concentration is increasing, although slowly. Seoul is changing from a manufacturing city to an administrative center, especially in the financial and administrative sectors. As a consequence, we can safely say that not only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms centralizing forces have outweighed the decentralizing forces in the growth of capital city. This does not, however, necessarily mean that urban primacy

in Korea is worsening when compared to other peripheral socieites. Quite contrary, despite the worsening situation of excessive centralization, Korea suffers less urban primacy than Latin American countries.

3) Another aspect of rapid urbanization in Korea can be found in the relative stability of the six major cities (at least in terms of population concentration) and in increasing regional disparities. Despite rapid urbanization, the rank status of six major cities has not been changed during last several decades, due mainly to past historical legacies and the colonial experience.

Contrary to the cases of major cities, intermediate-sized cities changed their rank status quite significantly. In most cases, the dynamics of these cities can be found in two growth regions of Seoul / Kyunggi and Pusan / Kyungsang area, Almost all of these cities were industrial cities. The internal structure of these intermediate-sized cities also show heavy concentration of production-related and manual workforces.

By contrast, agricultural regions experienced heavy losses of population and in a decade these regions lost population not only in relative terms but also in absolute terms.

The degree of urbanization in agricultural regions is very low and formerly major provincial cities in these areas have lost their rank status.

4) On the other side of widening regional disparities are increasing imbalances between urban and rural areas. Due to the heavy concentration of industrial activities in the two major growth regions, most of the rural population is still employed in agricultural activities and employment in manufacturing activities is losing importance in rural areas. Natural consequence of this rural decay has been a massive exodus of the rural population into urban areas and a deteriorating economic status of the rural population.

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# 공간과 발전

姜 明 求

본 논문의 목적은 비교적 관점에서 한국의 도시 / 지역 발전으로 대표되는 공간변화 현상을 조감하여 몇가지 특징적인 면을 추출해내고 한국에 독특한 몇가지 공간변화현상에 대한 설명을 가하는 것이다. 본 논문은 그 첫번째 부분으로서 1960년부터 1983년까지의 공간변화 현상을 도시화율, 수위도시집중현상, 도시구조, 도시 / 농촌 불균형 발전의 4가지 기준하여 살펴본다. 먼저, 이에 대한 이론적 준거로서 근대화론 및 중속이론의 비판적 연장선상에서 4가지 공간변화지표의 선택이유를 밝힌다.

- 1) 한국에 있어 도시화는 매우 짧은 기간에 급격한 변화를 이룬 것으로서 구미 선진제국은 물론이고 기타 3세계 국가와 비교해도 괄목할 만큼 급격하다. 따라서 이에 수반되는 사회, 정치, 경제, 행정의 제분야 에 끼친 폭도 크다.
- 2) 근대화론자들의 낙관적 예측과는 달리 생활권의 개념을 도입한 수도 서울의 성장은 인구 집중화의 지속적 현상이 목도 된다. 하지만 남미와 비교해 볼때 수위도시율은 상대적으로 낮다. 또한 수도 서울의 경제, 사회적 집중도는 인구집중도를 훨씬 뛰어넘고 있으며 수도 서울의 성격도 공업주심지에서 재정 및 행정위주의 도시로 탈바꿈하고 있다.
- 3) 도시구조에 있어 6대 도시의 안정적 순위가 눈에 띄나 20위권 이내의 중간급 도시에 있어서 현격한 자리 바꿈이 목도 된다. 특히 중위권 도시는 남미나 기타 3세계 국가에서 볼 수 없는 산업화된 도시로서 이는 정부극도형 수출중대 산업화 전략의 반영으로 이해될 수 있다.
- 4) 도시 / 농촌간의 격차는 일로 팽창하고 있으며 대만과 달리 농촌의 공업화는 지지부진하고 따라서 농촌지역에 있어서의 도시화율은 하락세를 면치 못하고 있다.