A Critical Review on the Study of Urban Service Distribution

Seung Jong Lee
(Fellow, Korea Local Administration Institute)

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Ⅰ. Introduction

Over the last two decades, the students of urban service research in American and European countries have produced a substantial set of theoretical and empirical studies, striving to answer the question of how urban services are distributed. This paper aims to present a short critical review on these studies.

In answering the question of urban service distribution, generally speaking, three explanatory models are now in competition (1) the political model emphasizing that the pattern of service distribution reflects the electoral consideration of politicians, (2) the class bias model positing that the distribution of urban services discriminates against the lower class neighborhoods and favors the neighborhoods dominated by the upper class, and (3) the bureaucratic model stipulating that the professional rational criteria of the bureaucracy determine the distribution of services. The following section will analyze the content of each model.

Ⅱ. The Prevailing Models of Urban Service Distribution

1. The Political Model

Assuming that elected officials are vote-maximizing rational actors (Downs, 1957 ; Riker, 196 2 ; Tullock, 1962 ; Niskanen, 1971, 1975 ; Fiorina, 1977), and that the bureaucracy is susceptible to the demands of elected officials, the political model posits that service distribution is a function of the electoral interests of elected officials. This is also called the "distributive hypothesis"(Lineberry, 1985).

Although the theoretical underpinnings of the distributive theory of policymaking have their roots in the literature on congressional policymaking process(e.g.Fenno, 1973 ; Mayhew, 1974 ; Fiorina, 1977), this hypothesis has also been applied to the literature of urban services(e.g., Banfield, 161 ; Long, 1958 ; Dahl, 1961 ; Greenstone and Peterson, 1973 ; Glassberg, 1973 ; Johnston, 1979 ; Elkin, 1987 etc.). While previous studies have shown that local elected officials have, besides the goal of reelection, other goals such as the economic growth of a city they govern(Peterson, 1981 : 29 ; Elkin, 1987 : 36), the preservation of the city's credit, and the regulation of conflicts among the city's credit, and the regulation of conflicts among the city's residents (Shefter, 1985 : 4), the primary goal of elected officials is winning election and other goals are either tertiary or the elements essential for gaining reelection. For example, Elkin (1987 : 18) maintains that the concern of elected officials with economic vitality of the city, one of the two imperatives of city officials, stems largely from their impetus for retaining office.

Given the assumption that the primary goal of elected officials is electoral victory, they should be sensitive to voting patterns that reflect the rates of political participation or support for incumbents, and also attentive to political implications upon electoral outcomes of their decisions for service distribution. Accordingly, elected officials will try to translate voting patterns into decisions about service distribution. With regard to this linkage between election and urban services, Cingranelli(1981)'s statement is explicit :

Electoral behavior is linked to municipal service policies through the mechanism of "area rewards", a form of policy choice similar in some ways to patronage. Area rewards involve payoffs to those neighborhoods which have played a key role in the electoral victory of political officials in the past or which are seen by incumbents as potentially playing a role in future elections. This linkage assumes that elected officials distribute resources by calculating the best way of ensuring

success in the next election.

In short, elected officials are likely to use public services to reward the neighborhoods supportive of the incumbents and to woo neighborhoods where electoral stakes are high (e.g. areas where rates of political participation by residents are high).

Implicit in the political model is that bureaucracies are under the control of elected officials. Whether such an assumption is applicable to the distribution of services is questionable, because many of the key decisions concerning service distribution are made by these bureaucracies. However, elected officials are in a position to exercise some degree of influence over the bureaucracies in distributing services because the level of revenue and expenditures are authorized in the political arena(Cingranelli, 1981 ; Jones and Kaufman, 1974). The leverage of elected officials on the bureaucracy is substantial, especially in a city with a political machine which trades bureaucratic positions for political loyalty. Therefore, machine cities like Chicago have been often employed to test the political model which posits the exchange between votes and services with the results favarable to its contention(e.g. Gosnell, 1937 ; Mladenka, 1980 ; Koehler and Wrighton, 1987). In sum, the indirect influence over the bureaucracy exercised by citizens through the medium of the electoral process is the main theoretical argument of the political model(cf, Rich, 1982 ; Aqua, 1982 ; Vedlitz and Dyer, 1984 ; Koehler and Wrighton, 1987 etc.).

2. The Class Bias Model

Floyd Hunter(1953) was among the first to question the importance of electoral politics in determining urban public policies and to highlight the influence of power elite(economic elite) over both elected officials and bureaucracies. Since then, the class bias model incorporating the conventional wisdom that urban service distribution is a function of either the discrimination against the lower class or the favoritism of the upper class —i.e. the "underclass hypothesis"(Lineberry, 1977)— has long been sustained in the study of urban service distribution.

This model implicitly assumes that elected officials are in good control of the bureaucracy and thus the interests of the upper class will be well transmitted, via elected officials, to the distributional decisions of the bureaucracy. Under this assumption, this model advances that the upper class, especially economic elites like businessmen, is able to attain favors in the distribution of urban services. However, it is false to assume that elected officials tightly control bureaucracies. Since at least some degrees of autonomy is maintained among bureaucracies, the influence exercised by the upper class upon elected officials is not always transferred to the bureaucracy.

One way in which the upper class benefits from service distribution is by exercising visible influence (demand) over the bureaucracy (through elected officials). The ability of the upper class to influence elected officials, and thereby the bureaucracy, is reinforced by the concern of elected officials about the economic well-being of the city. Although the most important imperative of elected officials is retaining their offices, they must be sensitive to the economic prosperity of the city as well, because poor performance in the city economy will endanger the possibility of continuing their positions.

New York City's experience of economic crisis in 1975 adequately illustrates this aspect. Edward Koch, a former mayor, had attracted so little support that he was even compelled to withdraw early from his first mayoral campaign in 1973. By vehemently denouncing Mayor Abraham Beame's poor leadership in confronting the city's fiscal crisis, and thereby undermining the Beame administration however, Koch won the mayoral race in 1977. Although there may be other contribution to his victory in 1977. the major factor was undeniably the fiscal crisis generated under the Beame administration(Shefter, 1985 : xiii). Peterson(1981 : 17-40) even went so far as to argue that economic prosperity is the single most important objective of local government.

Setting aside the discussion of whether economic interest is the most important objective of city government or simply an indispensible condition for retaining incumbencies, the main argument of the class bias model is that the communication between the upper class and the city's elected officials is facilitated by the medium of economy : the economic concerns of city officials are linked to their purpose of retaining office on the one hand, and the economic leverage of the upper class on the other hand.

The upper class may benefit from service distribution not only by its influence over the city officials, but also by invisible, structural influence -stemming from social stratification- imposed on the city officials. With regard to this less visible aspect of influence of the upper class, Bachrach and Baratz(1962) set forth the notion of "nondecision". This attests to the capacity of elite groups to restrict the scope of community decisionmaking. This less visible aspect of power, "the second face of power" in their term, is also referred to as "the mobilization of bias" by Schattschneider (1960). He stated that "all forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias"(Schattschneider, 1960 : 71). Stone(1980) also indicated the existence of an even more invisible source of influence of the upper class over public officials, that is, an inherent predisposition of public officials to favor the upper class over the lower class. According to him, this proclivity of public officials, elected or appointed, derived from the "systemic power" which signifies the impact of social stratification upon public officials. Systemic power can be distinguished from the "mobiliz

ation of bias" in that the mobilization of bias points to the distortion of decisions deriving from power imbalance between the upper class and the lower class, While systemic power refers to the inherent predispositions of public officials imposed by external factors. Nonetheless, they are same in that both posit that bureaucracies are influenced by social stratification. These sources of leverage by the upper class stem from their advantageous social and economic status. They even lead some to maintain that the study of urbanism is synonymous with the study of capitalist social relations (Katznelson, 1976 : 216).

According to this model therefore, the lower class is disfavored in service distribution not only because they lack articulate spokespersons but also they are not part of the upper class(Cingranelli, 1981). Certainly, the lower class also can exercise substantial influence over the bureaucracy, especially by taking the "voice" option like a collective protest (Hirschman, 1970 ; Lineberry, 1977 : 167 ; Skogan, 1975). In this regard, Saul Alinsky, a prominent neighborhood organizer, advocated militant tactics to develop sufficient mass power to force municipal government and established power groups to end their discrimination against the lower class (Alinsky, 1969, 1971). He actually demonstrated the effect of militant disruptive power of the lower class on public officials. The effectiveness of such option taken by the lower class is limited, however, when comparing with that of an equivalent option taken by its counterpart. Compared to that of the upper class, the influence of the lower class thends to be rather sporadic and transitory.

As indicated by Lineberry (1977 : 57), the class bias model(the underclass model in his term) includes various versions of the class bias model such as (1) the power elite model, (2) the economic elite model (the class preference model in his term), or (3) the race preference model at the same time. According to him, not only are the three versions of the class bias model the "three of a kind", but also the power elite, the economic elite, the racial majority are expected to work in tandem. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the class bias model can be further specified : the distribution of urban services will favor the power elite, the economic elite, and majority ethnic groups.

In a sense, the political model might be viewed as an another version of the class bias model. Take, for instance, the electorally disadvantaged who either failed to show support for the ruling political elite or have not been politically active. They can be considered as "the political lower class". Also the class bias model is similar to the political model in that the distributional decisions about urban services are presumed to be influenced by external factors —the electoral interest of elected officials (the political model), and the private interests of the upperclass mediated by public officials (the class bias model).

In short, both models are a kind of "bias" model explaining possible systemic bias in the distribution of services. Nonetheless, the two models can be distinguished since the political lower class

does not necessarily go in tandem with the powerless, the poor, or minorities. The two models can be contrasted as follows. (1) Whereas the political model attempts to explain the mechanism of external influence on the bureaucracy in terms of the electoral interests of elected officials, the class bias model emphasizes the impact of social structures on the bureaucracy aside from electoral politics. (2) Whereas the electoral consideration of elected officials is the most important element in service distribution for the political model, for the class model it is the interest of influential citiz en groups. (3) Whereas elected officials in the political model enjoy substantial "autonomy" in their decision, those in the class bias model lack such autonomous power and are susceptible to the interest of the upper class.

3. The Bureaucratic Model

The political and class bias models are useful in explaining two types of perverse biases of urban service distributions : (1) differential service distribution favoring the upper class neighborhoods, and (2) differential service distribution designed to maintain or enhance urban electoral coalitions. Yet the bureaucratic model attempts to describe the distribution of services as neutral to both class favoritism and electoral considerations. The core argument of this model is that bureaucratic decisions about service distribution are made in accordance with professionally determined objective decision criteria, and thus are immune to external political, racial and socioeconomic factors (Lineberry, 1977, 1985 : 64 ; Mladenka and Hill, 1978 ; Nivola, 1978 ; Jones et al., 1977 ; Rich, 1979 ; Viteritti, 1979 ; Mladenka, 1980, 1981 ; Levy, Meltsner, and wildavsky, 1974, Mladenka, 1978). Accordingly, neighborhoods which are in lower status in terms of race, socioeconomic status, or political power —or more broadly the traits for the "underclass"—do not incur unfavorable distributions of services.

According to this model, bureaucracies do not distribute services randomly. Rather, they distribute services in accordance with established bureaucratic service distribution. Bureaucratic decision rules for service distribution(or service delivery rules, see Jones, 1977 ; Jones et al. 1978) are routine arrangements for service distribution. Normally, bureaucratic rules for service distribution are formed to achieve the goals of bureaucratic agencies and at the same time to mitigate intraorganizational conflicts (Jones, 1977 ; Levy et al. 1974 : 227). Jones(1977) stated :

[Service delivery rules, i.e. bureaucratic decision rules for service distribution] often seem to be

attempts by the organization to cope with goal attainment and with intraorganizational tensions. Such tensions can arise from differing perceptions and wishes among groups in the organization and can involve the setting of work rules, real or anticipated management attempts to increase efficiency or productivity, or collective bargaining, for example. As a consequence of such compromises, service rules are almost never the most efficient or effective methods for impacting on agency goals. But they are almost always reasonably related to such goals.

Although bureaucratic decision rules about service distribution are not likely to be as efficient or effective in achieving the goals of bureaucratic agencies as he indicated, the rules certainly help reduce intraorganizational conflicts caused by the disagreements among bureaucrats about desirable goals of their agencies, and thereby facilitate goal attainment.

When bureaucratic decision rules for service distribution are rationally related to the goals of the service delivery agencies, they are termed professional. From the professional view point, an intrusion into the routinized decision rules by citizens or by the elected officials of local government is a bother, since there is generally a fair and legitimate rule for the distribution of services to which all reasonable men would agree (Jones et al., 1978). Also, it has been indicated that bureaucracies tend to distribute services based on legitimate rational criteria. Jones et al. (1978) stated that the bureaucracy more or less explicitly accepts goal of implementing rational criteria for the distribution of services to citizens, even though compromises may have to be made in the establishment of these criteria. This is closely related to the tendency of bureaucracies to pursue organizational self-interest

In general, such need criteria are legitimate and therefore acceptable by most people. Need measures for each district of a municipality are furthermore relatively easily available to the bureaucracy from departmental records or census data (Cingranelli, 1981). The bureaucracies, by employing such defensible and justifiable criteria for allotting benefits, can maintain the status quo (stability) and further strengthen their support bases(growth). Indeed, need criteria are common rationale which bureaucracies employ to explain and defend their distributive decisions, though it is still contentious whether the bureaucracies distribute services solely on the basis of need criteria (it is conceivable that the bureaucracies use needs simply for an excuse for their unacceptable service decisions). Officials at the Office of Management and Objective(OMB) in New York City interviewed in 1988, for example, indicated that the distribution of services corresponds to the needs of neighborhoods but not to such factors as electoral outcomes. Interviews by others reported similar results(see Mladenka, 1980 ; Cingranelli, 1981 ; Viteritti, 1979).

In a broad sense, the concept of need includes both (1) service needs and (2) service conditions. In a narrow meaning, the concept of need signifies service needs. More specifically, service needs refer to the needs for a particular service function. That is, service needs indicate the level of problems that are supposed to be solved by a particular bureaucratic agency which is exclusively designated to be in charge of handling the problems. Service needs can be measured by such indicators as circulation rate of books(library), percentage of aged housing(housing), crime rates or calls for services(police), number of users(park), the incidences of fire(fire), dilapidated housing units(housing), or poverty(human services) etc.

Generally speaking, the concept of need embraces service conditions as well as service needs(it seems that the concept of need in existing literature generally refers to service needs only. See for example Lineberry, 1977 ; Viteritti, 1979 ; Lucy, 1981 ; Coulter, 1987 ; Cingranelli, 1981). Service conditions are identical with "ecological attributes" of neighborhoods (Lineberry, 1977 : 62 ; Hirsch, 1968 ; Cingranelli, 1981). This category of needs is related to the broad concerns of various bureaucratic agencies rather than that of a particular agency. The indicators for service conditions are, for example, population, density, number of dilapidated housing, or poverty level and so on, most of which can be easily obtained from census data. But those like racial composition, class, and power structure that are prima facie political ones are not included in the concept of service conditions (see Lineberry, 1977 : 62). Although service needs and service conditions can be conceptually distinguished, these two subcategories of needs are, as is easily noticed, not necessarily mutually exclusive and thus it is often difficult to distinguish between service needs and service conditions. When service conditions are related to a goal of a particular agency, then service conditions are identical to service needs. Take for instance, the distribution of housing services such as demolition

or sealing. Housing conditions(i.e., a service condition) can be regarded as a criterion for service needs(but for the police department, housing condition is not likely to be a service need, and this illustrates the difference between a service need and a service condition).

In short, the criteria distinguishing between the two depend on the goal definition of service agencies. If a service condition which is broadly related to the service distribution of agencies as a whole, is also related to the goal of a particular agency, it can be called a service need for the agency. If a service condition is not specifically related to the goal of a particular agency but instead broadly related to the service distribution of agencies as a whole, then it remains as a service condition. To rephrase this : service needs refer to service specific needs, whereas service conditions refer to general service needs. A point to be stressed is that both service needs and service conditions can be employed in establishing bureaucratic decision criteria for service distribution.

It should be acknowledged that the bureaucratic decision rules formed on the basis of need criteria inevitably favor some groups over others. Although precisely who gets how much of these products is not normally a professional concern of the bureaucracy(Levy et al. 1974 ; 228 : Jones, 1977), regularized decision rules for service distribution invariably have distributional consequences. All areas and population groups may not receive the same level of services, but there may be no consistent bias against any groups or districts across services(Rich, 1982). Lineberry (1977) terms this "unpatterned inequality".

In sum, the bureaucratic model implies that the analysis of urban politics or class in studying the distribution of services. In its attempt to account for empirical results which seemed to invalidate political explanations and to respond to the failure of stratification theorists to consider bureaucratic discretion in urban policy making(Koehler and Wrighton, 1987), this model has accentuated the importance of an independent role of bureaucracies in service decisions which has often been neglected in other models. In this sense, this model expresses its most concern on the "missing link"

The Models of Service Distribution(Summary)

	Political model	Class bias model	Bureaucratic model
Most important actor	Elected officials	Influential citizens	Bureaucracy
Elected officials' influence	High	Low	Low
Bureaucratic autonomy	Low	Low	High
Citizen influence	High(indirect)	High (direct /indirect)	Low
Decision criteria	Electoral output	Social, economic, racial characteristics	Objective professional standarde(needs)

(Hargrove, 1975) between service decision and service outcomes.

For a comparison of the distinctive differences among the three models, a summary table is exhibited below.

Ⅲ. The Conflicting Findings

A variety of studies have tested these competing theoretical models on service distribution. The central question that these studies have attempted to answer is whether to external influences stemming from the socioeconomic status of neighborhoods or the political consideration of elected officials(Hero, 1986). Although the political model and the class bias model can be distinguished in terms of their different emphasis on what are important predictors of the pattern of service distribution(politics or socioeconomic status respectively), they are basically same models in that both models deny the neutrality of service distribution to external factors, and in their contentions that the distribution of services is biased in favor of the neigborhoods dominated by politically and socioeconomically advantaged groups. By contrast, the bureaucratic model posits that the distribution of municipal services is neutral and impervious to such external factors, and rather reflects the needs or service conditions of neighborhoods.

In light of this contrast between the models, the three models can be clustered into two broader categories : the bias models(i.e., the political model and the class bias model) and the neutral model (i.e., the bureaucratic model). Focusing on this broader distinction between the models of service distribution, this section will compare the literature of the neutral model(the bureaucratic model) with that of the biased model(the political model and the class bias model), and then give an evaluation of them.

Numerous empirical studies have supported the bureaucratic model. These studies include, for example, Blank et al. (1969), Weicher(1971), Levy et al.(1974), Lineberry(1975), Antunes and Plumlee(1977), Lineberry(1977), Mladenka and Hill(1977, 1978), Jones(1977, 1980), Jones et al. (1978), Nivola(1978), Rich(1979), Mladenka(1980, 1981), Sanger(1976, 1981, 1982), Vedlitz and Dyer(1984), and so forth.

In their studies of the distribution of library services in New York City, Blank et al.(1969) discovered significantly related to the socioeconomic or racial characteristics of neighborhoods. Weicher (1971) examined the distribution of police service in Chicago and reported that expenditures on police protection were not made primarily to serve rich and middle-income groups and did not involve income redistribution in favor of these groups. Rather, expenditures are distributed primarily

in favor of poor neighborhoods at the expense of non-poor neighborhoods.

Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky(1974) found that the distribution of services for schools, streets, and libraries in Oakland favored both the rich and poor. What they stressed was that bureaucratic decision rules can result in differential outcomes, and thus they called the distributional outcome "resultants". In addition, this is one of the first studies to substantially discredit the underclass hypothesis suggesting a linear relationship between socioeconomic traits of neighborhoods and the distribution of services.

Nivola(1976) analyzed the distribution of services within a street-level organization and concluded that housing inspection services in Boston have little to do with the pressures from political leaders or the neighborhood organizations, but reflect internal imperatives fo the administrative process within the housing inspection department itself. Also, in his extensive study of the service distribution in San Antonio, Lineberry(1977) reported that the distribution of parks, police, fire, libraries, and water and sewers in the city did not support the underclass hypothesis. In most service categories, poor neighborhoods or those with greater concentrations of minorities, were found to receive greater service benefits than others.

Antunes and Plumlee(1977), in a study of the quality of neighborhood streets in Houston, and Mladenka and Hill(1977), in their study of the distribution of parks and libraries also in Houston, found unequal distributions of city services but no evidence of discrimination against minority or poor neighborhoods. Rather, for example, the library bureaucracy automatically distributes resources on the basis of user rates, while the park bureaucracy disbursed available resources in a strictly equal basis. That is, the bureaucracies under examination complied with their own decision criteria in service distribution.

In their study of the service distribution of three Detroit bureaucracies (environmental enforcement, sanitation, and parks), Jones et al.(1978) showed that the distribution of services was primarily a function of service delivery rules of the bureaucracies under investigation. The Environmental Enforcement Division keyed service delivery to citizen requests ; the Sanitation Division adjusted its delivery system to actual use ; and the Parks and Recreation Division reflected existing facilities. Similarly, Mladenka(1980)'s analysis of the distribution of four services in Chicago -parks and recreation, fire protection, education, and refuse collection- showed that the distributional pattern of those services are a function of past reliance upon technical-rational criteria and professional values, but rejected the presumption that the Chicago political machine uses public service to reward loyal supporters and to punish enemies. He argued that urban bureaucracies are the major actor in the distribution process and abide by professional standards.

In the studies of the distribution of some services(police, fire, and sanitation) in New York City,

Sanger variable were significant in the distribution of police and fire expenditures. In sanitation expenditures, political participation turned out to be significant but negative, discrediting the political favoritism hypothesis. In a study of the bureaucratic response to all citizen—initiated requests for service from the Dallas city government, Vedlitz and Dyer(1984) tested three models of service distribution i.e. the political model, the class bias model, and the bureaucratic model. They found little support for either the political of the class bias model, and instead some empirical support for the bureaucratic one.

Supported by such substantial number of empirical studies which seem to invalidate either the political or class bias explanation of service distribution, Robert Lineberry, in his review article(19 85), even went so far as to assert that the bureaucratic model is the singls dominant model in explaining the pattern of urban service distribution. Koehler and Wrighton(1987), admitting the arguable dominance of the bureaucratic model, indicated that the dominance of the bureaucratic model is a unique phenomenon compared with other researches on national and state institutions and policy process, which tend to find not only administrative but political, social, and economic factors at work in decisions.

These conclusions are questionable however. It is still premature to accept the bureaucratic model as a single dominant model and to reject the other models as negligible ones in explaining urban service distribution, First, the flaws of the research designs of the studies supporting the bureaucratic model make their results difficult to accept without reservation. Their limitations are that most of the studies are in correlational, anecdotal, case studies of one or two services, or lacking relevant control variables.

Second, it should be acknowledged that the relative contribution of political, economic and administrative factors in decisions has not yet been subjected to conclusive empirical testing. That is, these researches have generally tested versions of the underclass hypothesis while neglecting to control for other essential variables such as needs or political support, and have interpreted the failure to produce large correlation between income or race variables and service delivery pattern as sufficient evidence that the bureaucracy, not politics, is at work(Koehler and Wrighton, 1987 ; cf, Lineberry, 1977 ; Mladenka, 1980). The low correlations could mean that it is random delivery, not bureaucratic.

For example, the study of Lineberry(1977), one of the most extensive study of urban service distribution, only tested versions of the underclass hypothesis and rejected them. Nonetheless, it concluded that the pattern of service delivery in San Antonio is the result of bureaucratic decision rules without mentioning anything about the impact of politics. Indeed, this hasty conclusion with no attention to political factors is unreliable and suspicious.

Third, a substantial unmber of studies reporting results contradicting the bureaucratic model can be instanced. Benson and Lund(1969), in a pioneering study of urban service distribution undertaken in Berkeley, California, reported that the consumption of public services such as police, health, inspection, library, recreation, and educational programs are systemically related to the socioeconomic status of neighborhoods. In his study of the pattern of citizen contacts with governmental agencies in Milwaukee neighborhoods, Jacob(1972) also found differences in the frequency of contacts with governmental agencies, particularly between whites and blacks. For example, blacks were more likely to have contact with welfare agencies, while middle-class whites were more likely to have contact with social security officials.

More importantly, some recent studies employing more rigorous research designs have produced strong counterevidence against the bureaucratic explanation of service distribution (Nardulli and Stonecash, 1981 ; Cingranelli, 1981 ; Boyle and Jacod, 1982 ; Abney and Lauth, 1982 ; Bolotin and Cingranelli, 1983 ; Browning et al., 1984 ; Koehler and Wrighton, 1987 ; Feiock, 1986 ; Pecorella, 1986).

Cingranelli(1981) probed the distribution of police and fire protection resources in Boston, and found some evidence for both the political and the class bias model. The regression results showed that residential neighborhoods with high levels of past support for the mayor and those containing high levels of business activity receive relatively high per capita service expenditures. Abney and Lauth(1982) examined the factors affecting decisions about service delivery and rule enforcement of city departmental heads, using data collected from a mail survey of three departmental heads (police, fire, and public works) in cities of 50,000 or more throughout the U.S. They found that allocation decisions were not immune from intervention by external actors like chief executives or interest groups whose requests were by no means neutral in nature, although the decisions were primarily based on neutral criteria.

Boyle and Jacob(1982) examined the distribution of municipal expenditures for public services of New York City, and reported that the pattern of service distribution in the city measured by expenditures is not necessarily a result of bureaucratic decision rules. Whereas the distribution of city expenditures for social services such as health, welfare, and education are primarily based on the degree of poverty in an area, expenditures for property-related services such as fire, and sanitation increase with a district's tax contributions. Notwithstanding their identification of the differential pattern of urban service distribution, their employing tax contribution as an independent variable in the multiple regression equations is problematic, for it parallels to other highly intercorrelated factors like occupational and poverty level. Although they did not report an intercorrelation matrix for the independent variables, the confounding among the core independent variables is

highly suspicious, and if so, it can severely depreciates the validity of the pattern of expenditure disbursement found in their study.

In a study of the distribution of police expenditure in Boston, Bolotin and Cingranelli(1983) found evidence supporting both the political and class bias medels. The level of police expenditures for each neighborhoods was closely related to the level of income and mayoral support when nonresidential business districts were controlled for. Feiock(1986) inquired into the underclass hypothesis by analyzing the distribution of service benefits and tax burdens for elementary education services in Erie, Pennsylvania, and found that while service benefits were likely to be distribution uniformly among neighborhoods, the distribution of tax benefits was regressive. Overall, the distribution of benefits / burdens was regressive, substantiating the underclass hypothesis. Pecorella(1986) examined the success rates of the communities of New York City in attaining their community capital budget priorities in the city's capital budget, and reported that the success rate is not neutral to socioeconomic characteristics such as minority percentage or household income level.

Koehler et al.(1987)'s study should be regarded as one of the most significant attacks on the bureaucratic explanation of urban service distribution. Among the proponents of the bureaucratic model of service distribution, Mladenka's study of the distribution of services —parks, fire, education, and refuse collection— in Chicago where machine politics prevails(Mladenka, 1980), has been regarded as the most significant evidence that urban service distribution are insulated from political consideration of elected officials. Citing Mladenka's study, Lineberry(1985) asserted that the result of the study "comes ominously close to being an acid test of the hypothesis that politicians manipulate policies to support their electoral coalitions". By replicating the park service portion of Mladenka's 1980 Chicago study with additional data for other years, however, Koehler et al. presented an evidence to negate Mladenka's conclusion that the Chicago bureaucracy is impervious to political factors. They found that the distribution of park facilities was significantly related to socioeconomic attributes (percent black, home ownership, and income level) and political attributes (votes for Daley) of the Wards of Chicago. Unfortunately, however, services other than parks were not reproduced in their study, and this weakens the validity of this study as an "acid test" of the bureaucratic model of service distribution.

It is notable that the studies which demonstrate the class bias model and / or the political model, use more rigorous research designs. Most of these analyses use multivariate, cross—service, or longitudinal designs with control variables. This suggests the importance of the control variables. This suggests the importance of the quality of research designs in the study of urban service distribution.

Although this recent reaction to the dominance of the bureaucratic model is in a sense potent, it is too early to conclude that the bureaucratic model is about to be overturned. It should be noted

that some researches with more sophisticated research designs have reported results supporting the bureaucratic model(e.g., Vedlitz and Dyer, 1984). In short, both the bureaucratic model and its counterparts have gathered substantial support from past research, and it is difficult to maintain which model is superior to the other models. Hence, it can be said that the competition among the explanatory models at the present time is still inconclusive(see also Rich, 1979 ; Hero, 1986).

Ⅳ. Evaluation

The inconclusive or contradictory findings of previous research suggests more clearly illustrate a necessity to develop a comprehensive theoretical model by which these conflicting models can be reconciled, that to persist in an unresolvable inquiry asking the relative superiority among the models. Surely, it is not futile to further examine the relative strength of each model over the others. But polarized discussions of the competing models are rather artificial or inadequate not only because there are strong evidence for each model as reviewed above but also because the very inconsistent evidence altogether suggests that aspects of each model can occur simultaneously in urban service decisions(cf, Abney and Lauth, 1982).

Unfortunately, however, the studies of urban service distribution have exposed a limitation in their research orientations. They have been to a degree directed toward empirical research focusing on research issues(e.g., Bolotin and Cingranelli, 1983), neglecting corresponding efforts to promote a more comprehensive theoretical model by which the current debate among the models can be reconciled. Focusing on whether urban service distribution reflects external socioeconomic, and political factors or not, what the controversy among the existing studies really amounts to is a win-or-lose battle mainly being backed by empirical evidence rather than by a more plausible and encompassing theoretical model. Indeed, as if producing more formidable empirical evidence will enhance their stance in the theoretical realm, urban researchers have endeavored to accumulate empirical evidence corresponding to the direction which they hypothesize, moving from service to service, and from city to city(e.g. Koehler and Wrighton, 1987 ; Bolotin and Cingranelli, 1983 ; Cingranelli, 1981 ; also see Dornan, 1977 ; Lineberry, 1974).

This research orientation of urban service distribution reminds us of the positivist's confirmatory tradition, which posits that one can use empirical evidence to provide a varying degree of positive support for the truth of scientific theories. Under the logic of confirmation, the larger the number of empirical tests which are in accordance with the predictions anticipated from a theory, the more

strongly confirmed is the theory. Similarly, the relative strength of rival theories also can be compared to their relative degrees of empirical support(Keat and Urry, 1975 : 3−22). But the confirmation achieved is at best confirmation of usefulness, rather than the truth of a theory over other theories(Cook and Campbell, 1979 : 10−21). The discussion above suggests that more efforts should be given to developing a more useful and comprehensive model than merely looking for more empirical evidence.

My judgment is that this indulgence in empiricism of the urban service literature is a natural result of the theoretical impasse in creating explanatory models which are more useful and persuasive. Where a deadlock confronted the effort to build up a more adequate or comprehensive theoretical model, their efforts inevitably began to be channeled to searching for more empirical evidence with emphasis on methodologies rather than theories.

I am not arguing that present effort to look for more formidable empirical evidence is futile. It is certainly helpful to find out more reliable evidence using a more rigorous research design for a better understanding of how urban services are distributed. Rather, I emphasize that a simple repeated effort to search for more empirical evidence without equivalent or more effort to develop the theories per se is less productive. It becomes apparent if we consider the fact that the current controversy on the primacy among the models is mostly originated from the unsophisticatedness of the theoretical models but not from a paucity of empirical evidence. Without an adequate and more comprehensive theoretical model therefore, we can only expect the continuation of polarized and endless controversy among the explanatory models because the seemingly contradictory models are not necessarily mutually exclusive and the contradiction among them is resolvable. I stress therefore that what we really need today in the research of urban service distribution is developing a more comprehensive theoretical model rather than more empirical evidence. Indeed, we would derive far more benefits from theory−driven research than black−box research(cf, Chen and Rossi, 1983).

V. Conclusion

The discussion so far has underlined an importance of developing a comprehensive theoretical model by which the conflict among existing models of overcoming such a theoretical deadlock is to introduce one important variable, i.e., urban service type to which little concern has been given in the previous research.

Indeed, it is naive to assume that the pattern of urban service distribution is invariably same across different service areas, but this has been an underlying presumption of the previous studies of service distribution It should are acknowledged that as suggested by the studies of policy typologies, policy processes and other factors such as external environment, service needs, and bureaucratic responses to them are different depending on service areas.

This also suggests that the contradictory findings in the previous studies are attributable to their failure to adequately identify the significance of service type in determining the distributional pattern of urban services. By giving new and serious attention to service type, accordingly, we can come up with a comprehensive theoretical model that overcomes the contradictions prevailing in the existing literature. In this regard, Elsewhere, I have alreach, presenteal such a model to link urban service the and service distribution(Lee, 1989). In short, the recognition of policy type matters in urban service distribution will considerably enhance our understanding of how urban services are distributed.

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〈國文抄錄〉

都市公共서비스 配分에 대한 批判的 考察

李 勝 鍾

지난 20여년간 都市問題를 연구해온 많은 歐美學者들을 도시의 公共서비스(muicipal services)가 관할구역내에서 과연 어떻게 配分되는가에 대한 해답을 찾는 노력을 통하여 상당한 수준의 理論的, 經驗的 연구를 축적해 왔다. 지금까지 제시된 도시의 공공서어비스에 관한 이론적 설명은 (1) 서어비스 배분이 選擧識 公務員(elected officials)의 선거에 대한 고려에 따라 영향을 받는다는 政治的 模型(the political model), (2) 下層階級 주민이 上層階級주민에 비하여 상대적으로 불리하게 서어비스가 배분된다는 階級差別 模型(the class bias model), 및 (3) 서어비스는 정치적인 고려나 주민의사회·경제적 지위에영향받지 아니하고 中立的인 行政官僚에 의하여 객관적, 합리적 결정기준에 따라 배분된다고 보는 官僚制的 模型(the bureaucratical model) 등 세가지 견해간의 論爭으로 要約될 수 있으며, 또한 이에 관한 經驗的 연구결과도 서로 一致하지 않고 있다.

지적할 것은 위 세가지 理論模型간의 論爭이 연구자자신들이 지지하는 各 理論模型이 他 이론모형보다 상대적으로 우월하다는 것을 입증하기 위한 경험적 증거수집에 치중한 나머지 불행히도 아직껏 이론적으로 踏步狀態에 머물고 있다는 점이다. 그러나 기존의 서어비스 배분에 관한 諸 이론모형은 사실상 相衝하는 것이 아니며, 또한 이들간의 논쟁이 추가적인 경험적 증거의 축적을 통하여 해소될 성질의 것도 아니다.

오히려 이같은 논쟁은 기존 이론 모형간의 모순을 조화시킬 수 있는 새로운 이론 모형의 개발을 통하여서만이 해소될 수 있는 것이다.

이와 관련하여 本稿는 아직껏 서어비스배분에 대한 연구에서 잊혀져 왔던 "서어비스의 유형"이 서어비스 배분형태를 결정짓는 중요한 요인(service type matters in service distribution)이라는 인식 하에 기초이론모형의 설명들을 포괄할 수 있는 통합이론모형(a comprehensive model)의 創出이 가능함을 제시하였다. 이는 서어비스의 배분형태가 서어비스의 종류와 무관하게 일정하리라고 암묵적으로 가정하고 있는 기초이론모형의 문제점을 직시하는데서쉽게알 수 있다.사실상 一見 모순되는 것처럼 보이는 諸 이론모형의 설명들을 서어비스유형의 서어비스 배분에 대한 효과에 대한 고려를 통하여 해소될 수 있는 것이며, 이에 대하여는 이미 이론적 설명과 함께 경험적 증거가 제시된 바 있다.(Lee, 1989)